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INTRODUCTION
In 2007, a Washington State juvenile court judge sentenced a seventeen-
year-old to 126 weeks of confinement after the teenager pled guilty to vehicular
homicide.' This sentence was seventy weeks higher than the standard range for
the charged offense and twenty-three weeks higher than the sentence requested
by the government. In arriving at the sentence, the judge considered an oral
victim impact statement from the decedent's father, read letters from the
victims' families and friends, listened to an apology from the child, and heard
mitigating evidence from the defendant's high school prevention specialist and
probation officer. In finding "manifest injustice" to impose a sentence so far
above the standard range, the judge noted that he was "disappointed" with the
teenager because he "did not somehow force himself to continue to look at" the
victims' families when he apologized.2 The judge told the teenager:
I think that was the least you owed them was to look at them in spite of
how bad it may hurt you or how bad you may feel at this time. I'm
disappointed that you chose not to or weren't able to put aside your
suffering and anguish and respect the families enough to look at them
while you were talking to them.... I'm just not impressed.., with
what you had to say.3
The judge concluded by noting that a lesser sentence would not "instill ...
confidence in the system" and that the "severe impact and tragedy to the
Copyright © 2009 California Law Review, Inc. California Law Review, Inc. (CLR) is a
California nonprofit corporation. CLR and the authors are solely responsible for the content of
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1. State v. A.V.R., No. 35032-7-II, 2007 WL 1335244 (Wash. Ct. App. May 8, 2007).
2. Id. at *2.
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families mandates a sentence more strict" than what the government requested.4
The victims' rights movement has made significant inroads into the
juvenile justice system during the last two decades. Legislators across the
country have amended state statutes and state constitutions to give victims the
right to attend juvenile hearings, be heard before critical decisions are made in
a juvenile case, and present oral or written victim impact statements at the
sentencing of an adjudicated youth.5 Victims' rights like these have shifted the
juvenile court's priorities and have altered the way judges and others think
about young offenders. The case from Washington is an example of the
considerable influence victim impact evidence may have on the fact-finder and
reflects the high expectations some juvenile court judges may have for
adolescent remorse and apology.
While the victims' rights movement has received considerable attention in
scholarship written about capital punishment and the criminal justice system
generally,6 there has been very little discussion about the impact of victims'
rights on the policy and practice of juvenile courts. While at one time, judges
primarily concerned themselves with the best interests of the delinquent child,
victims' rights statutes now require juvenile courts to balance the rehabilitative
needs of the child with other competing interests such as accountability to the
victim and restoration of communities impacted by crime. As victims actively
participate in the juvenile justice system, accused youth lose the protective veil
of confidentiality and face an expanding risk of retributive sentences from
judges who hear and empathize with the victim's plight.
The rise of the victims' rights movement parallels a broader shift in
juvenile court philosophy. Victims' rights were introduced in juvenile courts at
a time when policymakers were already rethinking their reliance on
rehabilitation as the primary goal of the juvenile justice system. In the 1980s
and 1990s, juvenile courts became increasingly concerned about public safety
and accountability and shifted their focus beyond rehabilitating the delinquent
child. The retributive elements of the victims' rights movement fit well with
these new law-and-order responses to juvenile crime and were readily
incorporated into juvenile statutes and procedures.
This Article focuses on one of the most widely endorsed victims' rights:
the right to introduce written and oral impact statements at the sentencing (or
4. Id.
5. See infra notes 47-53 and accompanying text.
6. See, e.g., Kenji Yoshino, The City and the Poet, 114 YALE L.J. 1835 (2005); Charles F.
Baird & Elizabeth E. McGinn, Re-Victimizing the Victim: How Prosecutorial and Judicial
Discretion Are Being Exercised to Silence Victims Who Oppose Capital Punishment, 15 STAN. L.
& POL'Y REV. 447 (2004); Jean M. Callihan, Victim Impact Statements in Capital Trials: A
Selected Bibliography, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 569 (2003); Peggy M. Tobolowsky, Victim
Participation in the Criminal Justice Process: Fifteen Years After the President's Task Force on
Victims of Crime, 25 N.E. J. ON CRIM. & CIv. CON. 21 (1999); Susan Bandes, Empathy,
Narrative, and Victim Impact Statements, 63 U. CH. L. REV. 361, 362 (1996).
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disposition) of an adjudicated youth. Victim impact statements provide the
court with information about the nature and extent of the victim's harm and
focus the court's attention on the victim's desire for catharsis, retribution, and
recovery of economic and material loss. While some proponents believe that
victim impact statements will also help rehabilitate young offenders, evidence
suggests that presenting these statements before the child has the benefit of
counseling and other rehabilitative services may actually hinder the court's
efforts to cultivate empathy and remorse in the child. Victim impact statements
delivered in the highly charged environment of the courtroom, without trained
mediators to facilitate discourse between the victim and the offender, are also
unlikely to foster the type of emotional healing and restoration that victims
seek.
In Part I of this Article, I briefly outline the parallel evolution of the
victims' rights movement and the law-and-order transformation of the juvenile
court and evaluate whether the philosophy of rehabilitation can and should
survive in the shifting juvenile court practice. Part I concludes with an
examination of the legislative history behind the extension of victims' rights
from criminal to juvenile courts. A review of that history suggests that many
legislators did not carefully consider the differences between the retributive and
rehabilitative goals of the criminal and juvenile justice systems in deciding to
extend rights to victims ofjuvenile delinquency.
In Part II, I consider the practical and theoretical conflicts that surface at
the intersection of victims' rights and juvenile justice. Specifically, I review the
rationale offered in support of victim impact statements and consider the extent
to which such statements inject a retributive element into the juvenile
disposition and lead the court to rely on unreliable information, such as the
victim's opinion about an appropriate disposition for the child. Part II also
suggests that because many youth are not intellectually and emotionally
equipped to experience and articulate sincere remorse in the days after an
offense, victims are often disappointed in the child's response to the victim
impact statement and judges are likely to penalize the child for an apparent lack
of empathy. Finally, Part II will consider ways in which victim impact
statements and other victims' rights compromise rehabilitation by eroding
confidentiality for juvenile offenders and potentially violating their right to due
process at disposition.
In Part III, I attempt to reconcile the many competing goals of juvenile
court by identifying procedural safeguards that will best accommodate the
needs and interests of victims and offenders. My recommendations include the
exclusion of victim impact statements from disposition hearings, the use of
trained mediators to facilitate face-to-face contact between victims and juvenile
offenders in pretrial diversion programs or victim-offender mediation sessions
after sentencing, and the development of victim impact curricula and
counseling that educate offenders about the impact of their crimes and victims
2009] 1109
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about the root causes of delinquency. These recommendations are supported by
empirical studies that suggest that victims often find greater satisfaction in
victim-offender mediation and other restorative justice programs than they do
in the limited interactions they have with offenders in court. This Article
concludes by recommending strict due process safeguards when courts must
consider victim impact statements at the juvenile disposition.
I
HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF VICTIMS' RIGHTS IN JUVENILE COURT
A. The Victims' Rights Movement and the Criminal Justice System
In colonial America, victims were responsible for filing suit against
criminal offenders.7 Victims hired public officials to help them investigate
crimes, file charges, and arrest and prosecute offenders. 8 By the middle of the
nineteenth century, the criminal justice system was transformed from a private
system into a public system in which the state was responsible for prosecution.
9
This shift was largely motivated by Enlightenment ideas that criminal
prosecutions should serve societal interests of retribution and deterrence rather
than the individual interests of victims in private redress.10 Under the new
public system, victims had no statutory or constitutional right to control the
prosecutor's decisions in the case."' The prosecutor became an advocate for the
state, not the victim, and the interests of the state and the victim did not always
align.
12
Since the middle to late twentieth century, the pendulum has begun to
swing back in the direction of private redress with the creation and enforcement
of victims' rights. The earliest victims' movements in 1972 were led by
women's rights activists in response to domestic violence and rape cases.
1 3
These activists complained that victims had no voice in the prosecutorial
process, were not being treated with sensitivity and respect by police and
prosecutors, and were not being provided with adequate restitution or services
to address the psychological, emotional, and material impacts of crime.1
4
7. Douglas E. Beloof & Paul G. Cassell, Crime Victim Law: Theory and Practice:
Symposium Article: The Crime Victim's Right to Attend the Trial: The Reascendant National
Consensus, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 481, 484-85 (2005); PEGGY M. TOBOLOWSKY, CRIME
VICTIM RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 5 (2001).
8. TOBOLOWSKY, CRIME VICTIM RIGHTS, supra note 7, at 5.
9. See Baird & McGinn, supra note 6, at 449.
10. TOBOLOWSKY, CRIME VICTIM RIGHTS, supra note 7, at 5.
11. Baird & McGinn, supra note 6, at 449.
12. See id. at 448-49.
13. LEIGH GLENN, VICTIMS' RIGHTS, A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 16 (1997); TOBOLOWSKY,
CRIME VICTIM RIGHTS, supra note 7, at 7.
14. TOBOLOWSKY, CRIME VICTIM RIGHTS, supra note 7, at 7; Rice Simmons, Private
Criminal Justice, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 911, 950 (2007).
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These early grassroots efforts received support from the federal
government through funding, research studies, and policy statements. In 1964,
President Lyndon Johnson established the Commission on Law Enforcement
and Administration of Justice which issued a report on victim-related issues,
including the need for increased involvement of victims in the criminal justice
process and the need for services to address victims' losses.1 5 In 1972, the Law
Enforcement Assistance Administration developed the first national survey on
crime victimization, and in 1974, established the Crime Victim Initiative to
serve as a resource for victim and witness assistance programs in local
prosecutors' offices and law enforcement agencies.16 In 1975, the first national
victims' related organization, the National Organization for Victim Assistance,
was established.17 Although the victims' rights movement experienced some
setbacks after the loss of funding in the late 1970s, President Ronald Reagan
reinvigorated the movement when he created the President's Task Force on
Victims of Crime in 1982.18 That task force issued a final report later that year
and recommended multiple reforms, including the presentation of victim
impact evidence at sentencing and the inclusion of victims and their families
who wish to attend the defendant's trial even if they have been identified as a
witness in the case.'9
State funding and legislation soon bolstered the federal victims' rights
initiatives. It appears that the earliest state victims' rights statutes were adopted
in the late 1970s and were followed by a peak in the adoption of similar statutes
across the country between the mid-1980s and mid-1990s. 20 Every state now
has some statute or series of statutes that confers an array of enforceable rights
on victims. A typical victims' rights statute includes the victim's right to be
notified of hearings, final adjudication, and the release or escape of the
defendant; the victim's right to consult with the prosecutor before plea or
dismissal; the victim's right to a speedy trial; the victim's right to present
written or oral impact statements at sentencing; and the victim's right to receive
restitution.21 In addition, at least thirty-two states now have state constitutional
provisions that grant victims rights similar to those afforded to the defendant.
22
15. TOBOLOWSKY, CRIME VICTIM RIGHTS, supra note 7, at 7.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. See Exec. Order No. 12,360, 47 Fed. Reg. 17,975 (Apr. 23, 1982) (establishing a Task
Force on Victims of Crime); see also TOBOLOWSKY, CRIME VICTIM RIGHTS, supra note 7, at 9-10;
Paul G. Cassell, Recognizing Victims in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: Proposed
Amendment in Light of the Crime Victims'Rights Act, 2005 BYU L. REV. 835, 841.
19. PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF CRIME: FINAL REPORT 72-73 (1987).
20. See infra notes 39 and 41, tracking the enactment of victims' rights legislation.
21. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 15-23-60 to -83 (LexisNexis 1995); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 13-4401 to -4437 (2001); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-4.1-302.5 (2008); D.C. CODE § 23-1901
(Supp. 2008); FLA. STAT. § 960.001 (West 2005 & Supp. 2008); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§
780.51-.911 (West 1998).
22. See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 6.01 (1995); ALASKA CONST. art. 1, § 24 (1994); ARIZ.
20091
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While these constitutional provisions may not be used to overturn a criminal
conviction and are generally unenforceable in a civil action against the state,23
they signal a growing respect and concern for victims.
B. The Shifting Juvenile Court Philosophy
While victims' rights gained national attention in the 1980s and 1990s,
significant changes also emerged in the stated policy and purpose of juvenile
courts across the country. Fueled by some of the same themes evident in the
victims' rights movement, legislators and judges became increasingly
concerned about public safety and accountability for delinquent youth.
Historically, juvenile courts were designed to facilitate nonadversarial
proceedings in which the judge and other friendly stakeholders worked together
to determine how best to treat or rehabilitate children involved in the juvenile
24justice system. Juvenile courts were established and continue to operate on
the principle that rehabilitation is a better response to delinquency than the
punishment and stigma that generally accompany an adult conviction.
25
CONST. art. II, § 2.1 (1990); CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28 (1982); COLO. CONST. art. II, § 16a (1992);
CONN. CONST. art. I, § 8(B) (1996); FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16 (1988); IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 22
(1994); ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8.1 (1992); IND. CONST. art. I, § 13(b) (1996); KAN. CONST. art. XV,
§ 15 (1992); LA. CONST. art. 1, § 25 (1998); MD. CONST. art. 47 (1994); MICH. CONST. art. I, § 24
(1988); MIss. CONST. art. 3, § 26A (1998); Mo. CONST. art. I, § 32 (1992); NEB. CONST. art. I, §
28 (1996); NEV. CONST. art. I, § 8(2) (1996); N.J. CONST. art. I, § 22 (1991); N.M. CONST. art. II,
§ 24 (1992); N.C. CONST. art. I, § 37 (1996); OHIo CONST. art. I, § 10 (1912); OKLA. CONST. art.
II, § 34 (1996); OR. CONST. art. I, § 42 (2008); R.I. CONST. art. I, § 23 (1986); S.C. CONST. art. I, §
24 (1998); TENN. CONST. art. 1, § 35 (1998); TEX. CONST. art. I, § 30 (1989); UTAH CONST. art. I,
§ 28 (1995); VA. CONST. art. I, § 8-A (1997); WASH. CONST. art. I, § 35 (1989); WIS. CONST. art.
I, § 9m (1993).
23. See Douglas Beloof, The Third Wave of Crime Victims' Rights: Standing, Remedy, &
Review, 2005 BYU L. REV. 255, 258-59; see also IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 22 (1994) ("Nothing in
this section shall be construed to authorize a court to dismiss a case, to set aside or void a finding
of guilt or an acceptance of a plea of guilty, or to obtain appellate, habeas corpus, or other relief
from any criminal judgment, for a violation of the provisions of this section; nor be construed as
creating a cause of action for money damages, costs or attorney fees against the state, a county, a
municipality, any agency, instrumentality or person; nor be construed as limiting any rights for
victims previously conferred by statute. This section shall be self-enacting. The legislature shall
have the power to enact laws to define, implement, preserve, and expand the rights guaranteed to
victims in the provisions of this section."); KAN. CONST. art. XV, § 15 (1992) (including similar
limitations); LA. CONST. art. 1, § 25 (1998) (including similar limitations); S.C. CONST. art. I, § 24
(including similar limitations); Ex parte Littlefield, 540 S.E.2d 81, 85 (S.C. 2000) ("[E]ven if the
solicitor fails to honor the Victims' Bill of Rights during a criminal proceeding, the Supreme
Court cannot issue a writ of mandamus to re-open a criminal proceeding once it is resolved.").
24. See Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, The Evolution of Adolescence: A
Developmental Perspective on Juvenile Justice Reform, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 137, 138
(1997); see also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14-16 (1967).
25. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-302 (2008) (juvenile code construed "[t]o protect
society more effectively by substituting for retributive punishment, whenever possible, methods of
offender rehabilitation and rehabilitative restitution"); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 53
(West 2008) (juvenile court shall treat children, "not as criminals, but as children in need of aid,
encouragement and guidance"); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-101 (2005) (juvenile code construed
"[c]onsistent with the protection of the public interest, [to] remove from children committing
1112
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However, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, several high-profile juvenile
crimes spawned public anxiety and led to predictions of an emerging juvenile
26
super predator. National perceptions of high and rising crime generated
pressure on state legislators to toughen laws that addressed juvenile
delinquency. Although data raises doubt as to the validity of these
perceptions,28 state legislatures responded by introducing accountability and
punishment into juvenile court legislation. 29 As a result, contemporary law-and-
order policies make it easier for prosecutors to transfer juveniles to adult court,
create presumptions for detaining youth pending trial, impose mandatory
minimum sentences for juveniles, lift the protective veil of confidentiality in
juvenile proceedings, and require juveniles to register in sex-offender
databases.
30
The shifting juvenile court agenda is also evident in recent amendments to
the purpose clauses that often accompany state juvenile court codes. While
most purpose clauses still manifest a commitment to the rehabilitation of
children, those clauses now also reflect a growing concern for the interests of
victims, the accountability of the offending youth, the safety of the community,
delinquent acts the taint of criminality and the consequences of criminal behavior and substitute
therefore a program of treatment, training and rehabilitation").
26. See David S. Tanenhaus & Steven A. Drizin, "Owing to the Extreme Youth of the
Accused": The Changing Legal Response to Juvenile Homicide, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
641, 642 (2002); Scott & Grisso, supra note 24, at 137, 141 (identifying three waves of attack on
juvenile justice policy and describing the most recent attack beginning in the late 1980s as a
response to "public fear and anger" at youth violence).
27. See Tanenhaus & Drizin, supra note 26, at 642.
28. RICHARD A. MENDEL, AMERICAN YOUTH POLIcY FORUM, LESS HYPE, MORE HELP:
REDUCING JUVENILE CRIME, WHAT WORKS-AND WHAT DOESN'T 29-37 (2000); HOWARD N.
SNYDER & MELISSA SICKMUND, NAT'L CTR. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND
VICTIMS: 2OO6 NATIONAL REPORT 127 (2006) (reporting that between 1994 and 2003, there were
substantial declines in arrests for overall juvenile violent crime (-32%), murder (-68%), forcible
rape (-25%), robbery (-43%), and aggravated assault (-26%). These declines were proportionately
greater for juveniles than for adults).
29. See Tanenhaus & Drizin, supra note 26, at 642 (noting that between 1990 and 1996,
"forty states passed laws to make it easier to prosecute juveniles as adults"); Barry C. Feld, The
Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of Offense: Punishment, Treatment, and the Difference It
Makes, 68 B.U. L. REV. 821, 843-45 (1988); Ralph A. Rossum, Holding Juveniles Accountable:
Reforming America's "Juvenile Injustice System", 22 PEPP. L. REV. 907, 918-22 (1995).
30. See Kristin Henning, Eroding Confidentiality in Delinquency Proceedings: Should
Schools and Public Housing Authorities Be Notified?, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 520, 536 (2004);
Suzanne Meiners-Levy, Challenging the Prosecution of Young "Sex Offenders": How
Developmental Psychology and the Lessons of Roper Should Inform Daily Practice, 79 TEMP. L.
REV. 499, 504-05 (2006); Elizabeth Garfmkle, Comment, Coming of Age in America: The
Misapplication of Sex-Offender Registration and Community-Notification Laws to Juveniles, 91
CALIF. L. REV. 163, 184-97 (2003) (discussing ways in which juvenile sex-offender registration
departs from traditional juvenile justice policy); Arthur R. Blum, Comment, Disclosing the
Identities of Juvenile Felons: Introducing Accountability to Juvenile Justice, 27 LoY. U. CHI. L.J.
349, 393-96 (1996) (discussing state laws that erode confidentiality for certain serious offenses
committed by juveniles).
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and sometimes even the punishment of the child.3' For example, Illinois
legislators amended the juvenile justice code in 1999 to declare that juvenile
justice policies shall "[h]old minors accountable for their unlawful behavior
and not allow minors to think that their delinquent acts have no consequence
for themselves and others." 32 In 1995, the New Hampshire legislature deleted
statutory language explaining that its juvenile code was designed "to remove
from a minor committing a delinquency offense the taint of criminality and the
31. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-15-1.1 (LexisNexis 2005) (added in 1990 "to facilitate the
care, protection, and discipline of children who come within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court,
while acknowledging the responsibility of the juvenile court to preserve the public peace and
security"); ALASKA STAT. § 47.12.010 (2006) (repealed and reenacted in 1998 to, among other
things, ensure a "balanced juvenile justice system," "protect the community," "impose
accountability for violations of law," and "provide an early, individualized assessment and action
plan for each juvenile offender ... so that the juvenile is more capable of living productively and
responsibly in the community"); CAL. WELFARE & INST. CODE § 202 (West 1998 & Supp. 2008)
(amended in 1998 to hold the offender accountable in order to restore the victim or community
through victim impact classes, victim-offender conferencing, and restitution, while continuing to
recognize the importance of the minor's best interests); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-121 (West
2004) (amended in 1995 to give courts authority to make and enforce orders necessary to punish
the child, deter the child from further delinquent acts, assure safety of others, and provide
restitution to the victim); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.01 (West 2006) (enacted in 1997 to "[t]o ensure
the protection of society, by providing for a comprehensive standardized assessment of the child's
needs so that the most appropriate control, discipline, punishment, and treatment can be
administered consistent with the seriousness of the act committed, the community's long-term
need for public safety, the prior record of the child, and the specific rehabilitation needs of the
child, while also providing whenever possible restitution to the victim of the offense"); IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 20-501 (2004) (amended in 1995 to ensure that "[w]here a juvenile has been found
to be within the purview of the juvenile corrections act, the court shall impose a sentence that will
protect the community, hold the juvenile accountable for his actions, and assist the juvenile in
developing skills to become a contributing member of a diverse community"); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 31-10-2-1 (West 2008) (added in 1997 to "promote public safety and individual accountability
by the imposition of appropriate sanctions," and to "ensure that children within the juvenile justice
system are treated as persons in need of care, protection, treatment, and rehabilitation"); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 38-2301 (Supp. 2007) (enacted in 2006 to identify the primary goals of the juvenile
justice code as "promot[ing] public safety, hold[ing] juvenile offenders accountable for their
behavior and improv[ing] their ability to live more productively and responsibly in the
community"); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 600.010 (LexisNexis 1999 & Supp. 2007) (amended in
2000 to promote the best interests of the child by "providing treatment and sanctions to reduce
recidivism and assist in making the child a productive citizen by advancing the principles of
personal responsibility, accountability, and reformation, while maintaining public safety, and
seeking restitution and reparation"); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 801 (2004) (added in 1991 to
ensure that each child receives "the care, guidance, and control that will be conducive to his
welfare and the best interests of the state" and amended in 1993 to acknowledge more serious
penalties required for certain enumerated felonies); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 3002 (2003)
(amended in 1997 "[tjo provide consequences, which may include those of a punitive nature, for
repeated serious criminal behavior or repeated violations of probation conditions"); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2151.01 (LexisNexis 2007) (deleting the following purpose from the code in 2000:
"to protect the public interest in removing the consequences of criminal behavior and the taint of
criminality from children committing delinquent acts," but retaining its commitment "to provide
for the care, protection, and mental and physical development of children").
32. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/5-101 (West 2007) (added by 2008 I11. Legis. Serv.
P.A. 90-590, art. 2001, § 2001-10 (West), effective Jan. 1, 1999).
1114 [Vol. 97:1107
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penal consequences of criminal behavior." 33 Legislators revised the language of
the statute to
promote the minor's acceptance of personal responsibility for
delinquent acts committed by the minor, encourage the minor to
understand and appreciate the personal consequences of such acts...
and make parents aware of the extent if any to which they may have
contributed to the delinquency and make them accountable for their
role in its resolution.
34
In Washington State, the purpose clause was amended in 2004 to provide
opportunities for victims to participate in the juvenile justice system and to
ensure that the state's victims' bill of rights would be fully observed.35
C. Victims' Rights in Juvenile Court
Today, most states grant victims of juvenile delinquency some or all of
the rights guaranteed to victims of adult crime. It is not clear whether the
expansion of victims' rights into juvenile court simply reflects the larger shift
in juvenile justice philosophy or whether the victims' movement itself
precipitated the court's philosophical change. However, because theories of
retribution and accountability for the offender justify many of the rights
afforded to victims, 36 it is no surprise that the victims' rights movement made
its greatest inroads into juvenile court during the 1980s and 1990s. Some critics
have even argued that crime-control advocates intentionally co-opted the
victims' rights movement to push systemic reforms that increase the likelihood
of conviction and incarceration for offenders.37 Regardless of which came first,
these developments have been closely intertwined and were both likely fueled
by the media's attention to high-profile juvenile offenders, questionable
perceptions of rising juvenile crime, public pressure for improved safety, and
victims' desire to be heard and secure restitution for crimes.
38
While most states now have some protections for victims of delinquency,
not all states included victims of juvenile delinquency in their initial victims'
rights legislation. A survey of state legislation reveals a couple of interesting
trends. First, with a few exceptions, victims' rights statutes enacted in the
1980s tended to apply only to victims of adult crime.39 During the following
33. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-B:1 (LexisNexis 2001), amended by 1995 N.H. Laws ch.
308 (H.B. 2).
34. Id.
35. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.40.010(2)(k) (West 2004), amended by 2004 Wash.
Legis. Serv. ch. 120 (West).
36. See infra notes 116-119.
37. See, e.g., TOBOLOWSKY, CRIME VICTIM RIGHTS, supra note 7, at 9 (listing denial of
bail, abolition of exclusionary rule, mandatory sentencing, and elimination of parole as examples
of reforms that are consistent with the crime-control approach).
38. See supra notes 26-30 and 13-14 and accompanying text.
39. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.61.010 (2006) (effective 1984, amended to include
victims of juvenile crime in 1997); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-201 (West 2001) (enacted in
2009] 1115
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decade, however, most of those states amended that legislation to include
victims of juvenile delinquency. In a second apparent trend, states that did not
pass their first victims' rights statutes until the 1990s or later tended to
recognize the same rights for victims of juvenile and adult crime in the original
legislation.4' A few states have not yet explicitly extended victims' rights to the
1978, amended in 1995 to include any crime committed by a juvenile); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 46b- 1 38b (West 2004) (enacted in 1989 to give victims the right to make statement at juvenile
dispositions); D.C. CODE § 16-2340 (Supp. 2008) (enacted in 2005 to grant rights to victims of
juvenile crime); D.C. CODE § 23-103a (enacted in 1989 to confer rights on victims of adult crime,
repealed 2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 960.001 (West 2006 & Supp. 2008) (enacted in 1984 and
amended in 1992 to include victims of juvenile delinquency); HAW. REV. STAT. § 801D-4
(LexisNexis 2007) (enacted in 1988 and amended in 1990, 1991, and 1998 to give minimal rights
to victims of juvenile offense); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-5306 (2004) (enacted in 1985 and
amended in 1995 to include victims of juvenile offenses); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 120/1-9
(West 2002) (enacted in 1984 and amended 1993); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/5-115 (West
2007) (enacted in 1998 to give victims in juvenile proceedings the same rights as victims in adult
proceedings); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-7333 (2002) (enacted in 1989 and amended in 1993 to give
rights to victims of juvenile delinquency); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:1841-45 (1999) (enacted in
1985 and amended in 1992 to change the definition of crime to encompass delinquency so that
victims of juvenile crime would be included); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 811.1 (2004) (enacted
in 1993 to give rights to victims of alleged delinquent acts); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258B,
§§ 1-3 (West 2008) (enacted in 1983 and amended in 1995 to include delinquency court in the
definition of court); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 595.200 (West 2003) (enacted in 1986 and amended in
1993); NEV. REV. STAT. § 217.070 (2005) (enacted in 1969 and amended in 1997 to include
victims of juvenile crime in definition of victim); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:4B-34 to -38 (West
2006) (enacted in 1985, section 52:4B-37 amended in 2001 to include act of delinquency in
definition of crime); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 215.33 (West 2000) (enacted in 1981 and
amended in 1994 to require notice of hearing to victims of juvenile crime); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 419C.41 l(4)(e) (2007) (amended in 1995 to require judges to consider statement of victims at
juvenile disposition); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 7.69.010-050 (West 2007) (enacted in 1985
and amended in 2004 to apply to victims ofjuvenile delinquency). Exceptions to this trend include
CAL. WELFARE & INST. CODE §§ 679-679.08 (West 1998 & Supp. 2008) (victims of juvenile
delinquency included at enactment in 1986); MICH. COMp. LAW ANN. §§ 780.751-.775 (West
2007) (enacted in 1985 and amended in 1988 to add sections 780.781-801 to include victims of
juvenile delinquency); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-824 to -827 (2007) (victims of juvenile offenses
that would be a felony or serious misdemeanor if committed by an adult included at enactment in
1985); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-34-01 to -05 (1997) (victims ofjuvenile delinquency included at
enactment in 1987); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 5301-5307 (1998 & Supp. 2008) (victims of
juvenile delinquency included at enactment in 1985).
40. Id.
41. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 15-23-60 to -84 (LexisNexis 2005) (victims of juvenile
delinquency in "Crime Victim Rights" chapter included at enactment in 1995); ARK. CODE ANN.
§§ 16-90-1101 to -1115 (2008) (victims of juvenile delinquency included at enactment in 1997);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 9401-9408 (2007) (victims of juvenile delinquency included at
enactment in 1992); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-40-5-1 to -9 (West 2008) (victims of juvenile
delinquency included at enactment in 1999); IOWA CODE ANN. § 915.10-.29 (West 2004) (victims
ofjuvenile delinquency included at enactment in 1998); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. §§ 11-101
to -104 (LexisNexis 2008) (all sections enacted in 2001 include victims of delinquent acts); §§ I 1-
201 to -205 (pretrial services); §§ 11-301 to -304 (trial procedures); §§ 11-401 to -404 (sentencing
procedures); §§ 11-501 to -508 (post-sentencing procedures); §§ 11-601 to -620 (restitution and
other payments); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 99-43-1 to -49 (2007) (enacted in 1999); S.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 16-3-1505 to -1565 (2003) (victims of juvenile delinquency included at enactment in 1997).
But see ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, §§ 1175-1176 (2003) (enacted in 1995 to give rights to
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42juvenile justice system.
Victims' rights in juvenile court essentially mirror those rights guaranteed
to victims in the criminal justice system. While some states have separate
juvenile code provisions that specifically protect victims of juvenile crime,
43
many states have one statute-typically located in the state's criminal code-
that confers rights on all victims. 44 These latter states often extended rights to
victims of delinquency by amending the definition of key words such as
"victim," "crime," or "court. '45 When state legislators drafted separate juvenile
code provisions for victims, they often tracked or referenced the language of
the criminal code.46 Like victims of adult crime, victims of juvenile
delinquency typically have the right to notice of the child's release or escape
from detention,47 the rights to confer with the prosecutor and to be heard in
victims of crime); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 3007 (2003) (enacted in 1999 to give victims of
juvenile crime the same rights as victims under title 17-A, section 1175, which addresses victim
notification of a defendant's release); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2930.01-.19 (LexisNexis 2006 &
Supp. 2008) (enacted in 1994 and amended in 1999 to include victims of juvenile delinquency);
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 11-101 to -216 (West 1998) (enacted in 1998 and amended in 2000 to
include proceedings within the juvenile justice system); Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-21-101 to -103
(2007) (enacted in 1990 to allow victim impact statements for felonies); Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-
6-501 to -509 (2007) (victim bill of rights for juvenile court enacted in 1998); UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 77-38-1 to -14 (2003) (enacted in 1994 and amended in 1995 to include victims of juvenile
crime).
42. For example, although Tennessee and West Virginia statutes require juveniles to pay
restitution, neither state appears to provide any other substantive rights to victims of juvenile
crime. See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-5-13b (LexisNexis 2004 & Supp. 2007); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 37-1-131 (2005 & Supp. 2008).
43. See, e.g., LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 811.1 (2004); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-1416
(2007); OR. REV. STAT. § 419C.411 (2007); Wvo. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-6-501 to -509 (2007).
44. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.61.010 (2006); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 960.001 (West 2006
& Supp. 2008); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 801D-4 (LexisNexis 2007); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 120/4 (West 2002); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 611 A.0 1-.06 (West 2003 & Supp. 2008); Mo.
ANN. STAT. §§ 595.200-215 (West 2003); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-34-01 to -05 (1997); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2930.01-.19 (LexisNexis 2006 & Supp. 2008); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 11-101 to -216 (West 1998).
45. See, e.g., 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 120/3 (West 2002) (redefining crime and victim);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:1842 (1) (1999 & Supp. 2008) (redefining crime); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 258B, § 1 (West 2008) (redefining victim and court); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4B-37 (West
2001 & Supp. 2007) (redefining victim to include person harmed by an act of delinquency); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 217.070 (LexisNexis 2005) (redefining victim to include any person harmed
by an act committed by either adult or minor); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 11-103 (West 1998)
(redefining crime to include an act committed by a juvenile).
46. See, e.g., 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/5-115 (West 2007) (stating that victims in
juvenile cases "shall have the same rights of victims in criminal proceedings").
47. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 8-393, 8-395 (2007) (requiring notice of release or
escape); CAL. WELFARE & INST. CODE § 679.02(5), (6), (14) (West 1998 & Supp. 2008) (allowing
victims to express views at parole eligibility hearing, work furlough, and release on probation);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 61 1A.06 (West 2003 & Supp. 2008) (requiring notice of release); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 595.209.1(5)-(7) (West 2003 & Supp. 2008) (requiring notice to victims and witnesses of
release and escape); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-B:35-a (2001) (requiring notice of "all review
hearings, ... change in placement, temporary release or furlough, interstate transfer, parole,
runaway, escape or release"); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7B-2513(j), 2514(d) (2007) (requiring notice to
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court before critical decisions are made, 48 and the rights to a speedy trial49 and
restitution.50 Juvenile statutes, unlike those concerning adult crime, often create
an additional obligation on the child's parents to pay restitution to the victims
of the child's conduct.5 1 Victims of delinquency also have the right to attend all
stages of a juvenile case, notwithstanding other statutes that typically bar public
access to family court proceedings. 52 Finally, in most states, victims are
allowed to submit victim impact evidence at the child's disposition.
53
D. Survival of the Rehabilitative Promise in Juvenile Court
Notwithstanding the introduction of victims' rights and accountability into
the juvenile court mission, the weight of contemporary evidence still
recognizes rehabilitation as a viable objective for the juvenile justice system.
Legislative action across the country, appellate court and Supreme Court
jurisprudence, and recent psychological and neurological studies in adolescent
development all demonstrate that juvenile courts can and should continue their
victims and victims' immediate family of child's release); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-34-02(3), (16)
(1997) (requiring notice of pretrial and custodial release); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2930.16
(LexisNexis 2006 & Supp. 2008) (requiring notice of incarceration or release); 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 11-201 (West 1998) (requiring notice of release or escape).
48. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-403 (2001) (right to confer with prosecutor and
be heard in court regarding plea negotiation); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 9405 (2007) (right to
consult with prosecutor before prosecutor amends or dismisses charge, negotiates plea, or agrees
to diversion); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 960.001 (West 2006 & Supp. 2008) (right to express views
about release, plea, diversion, or sentencing); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 61 IA.03-.031 (West 2003 &
Supp. 2008) (right to object to plea agreement, pretrial diversion, or disposition); Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 595.209(l)(4) (2003 & Supp. 2008) (right to confer with prosecutors and be heard at plea
hearings); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-1416 (2007) (right to consult with state attorney before
dismissal or reduction of charge from a felony or release of youth from detention or disposition);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 169-B:34, 35-a (LexisNexis 2001 & Supp. 2007) (right to confer with
prosecutor about disposition and plea bargaining and make statement in court prior to plea); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 52:4B-44(15) (West 2001 & Supp. 2007) (right to have prosecutor consider victim
impact statement before deciding whether to formally prosecute); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2930.08 (LexisNexis 2006) (right to object to delay in prosecution); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 11-201(4) (West 1998) (right to comment before reduction of charge, dismissal, plea, diversion,
or consent decree).
49. See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4435 (2001); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 9405
(2007); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 960.001 (West 2006 & Supp. 2008); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-110
(2004); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 780.786a (West 1998); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 61 1A.033(a)
(West 2003); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 595.209.1(16) (West 2003 & Supp. 2008); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 12.1-34-02(12) (1997).
50. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-15-1.1(7) (LexisNexis 2005); ALASKA STAT.
§ 47.12.120(b)(4) (2006); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-2-918 (2008); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 61 1A.04
(West 2003); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-1521 (2007); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 353.6 (McKinney
2008). See also MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-1512(1)(n) (2007) (court may order youth "to pay a
contribution covering all or part of the costs of a victim's counseling").
51. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-15-71 (LexisNexis 1995); ALASKA STAT. § 47.12.120(b)(4)
(2006); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-2-919 (2008); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-140(b), (d) (West 2004);
D.C. CODE § 16-2320.01 (Supp. 2008).
52. See further discussion and examples infra Part ll.D.
53. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 831 (1991).
1118 [Vol. 97:1107
VICTIMS' RIGHTS IN JUVENILE COURT
efforts to rehabilitate young offenders. First, although many states have
incorporated accountability and public safety into juvenile justice legislation,
none have abandoned rehabilitation as an equally if not more important goal for
the juvenile justice system. 54 State statutes manifest an ongoing commitment to
the rehabilitation and treatment of children by requiring that judges act in the
best interests of the minor, provide care and guidance conducive to the child's
welfare, and identify a continuum of services that will make the child a
productive citizen. 55 In addition, several state legislators have explicitly
recognized that children should be held accountable only to the extent
appropriate given the child's age, education, mental and physical condition, and
background.56 At least one jurisdiction has endorsed the goal of public safety
while maintaining a premium on rehabilitation.
57
Appellate courts have also continued to endorse rehabilitation as an
appropriate and mandated response to juvenile delinquency. 58 Seven years after
Illinois legislators revised the state's juvenile justice purpose clause, 59 Illinois
appellate courts continue to recognize rehabilitation as a primary goal of the
juvenile court. In 2006, the Supreme Court of Illinois made the following
observation:
Even as the legislature recognized that the juvenile court system
should protect the public, it tempered that goal with the goal of
54. See supra note 31.
55. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-302 (1987 & Supp. 2007) (purpose is "to protect
society more effectively by substituting for retributive punishment, whenever possible, methods of
offender rehabilitation and rehabilitative restitution"); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1-102 (2005)
(purpose is "[t]o secure for each child . . . such care and guidance . . . as will best serve his
welfare"); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-121h (West 2004) (juvenile justice system is to
"provide individualized supervision, care, accountability and treatment"); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-
11-1 (2008) (purpose, enacted in 1971 with no substantive amendments thereafter, is to require
that each child shall receive "the care, guidance, and control that will be conducive to the child's
welfare"); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 571-1 (LexisNexis 2005) (intended "to promote the
reconciliation of distressed juveniles with their families, foster the rehabilitation of juveniles in
difficulty, render appropriate punishment to offenders," and requiring that all children "receive
dispositions that provide incentive for reform or deterrence"); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.1 (West
2004) (purpose, enacted in 1979 with no substantive amendments thereafter, is to ensure that
"each child . . . shall receive the care, guidance and control that will best serve the child's
welfare"); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 712A.1(3) (West 2002) (noting purpose is to provide care,
guidance, and control conducive to the child's welfare).
56. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-15-1.1 (LexisNexis 2005); D.C. CODE § 16-2301.02 (Supp.
2008); N.M. STAT. § 32A-2-2 (2004); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.40.010 (West 2004).
57. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-2301.02 (Supp. 2008) (enacted in 2005 to "provide for the
safety of the public," while placing a "premium on the rehabilitation of children with the goal of
creating productive citizens" and holding "the government accountable for the provision of
reasonable rehabilitative services").
58. See, e.g., Lopez-Sanchez v. State, 843 A.2d 915, 926 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004)
(recognizing General Assembly's desire to provide for the rehabilitation of delinquent youth in
concluding that victim of delinquent act was not a party to any proceeding and did not have a right
to vindicate private interests or to appeal from any final ruling of the juvenile court).
59. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
2009] 1119
CALIFORNIA LA W REVIEW
developing delinquent minors into productive adults, and gave the trial
court options designed to reach both goals. Article V may represent "a
fundamental shift from the singular goal of rehabilitation to include the
overriding concerns of protecting the public and holding juvenile
offenders accountable for violations of the law," but proceedings under
the Act still are not criminal in nature. "Delinquency proceedings
are... protective in nature and the purpose of the Act is to correct and
rehabilitate, not to punish. 6 °
Eight years after Washington State legislators amended several sections of
the state Juvenile Justice Act, the state appellate courts, like those in Illinois,
concluded that recent amendments to the code did not negate the rehabilitative
focus of juvenile court.6 1 In 2005, a Washington appellate court noted that:
Notwithstanding the adoption in 1997 of amendments to the juvenile
justice code that tended to make it more punitive, we recognized the
"unique rehabilitative nature of juvenile proceedings" as a continuing
rationale for having judges, not juries, decide cases involving juvenile
offenders .... [T]he juvenile justice provisions as amended still retain
significant differences from the adult criminal justice system and still
afford juveniles special protections not offered to adults."62
California appellate courts were asked to interpret changes in the purpose
clause of its state juvenile justice code much earlier than courts in other states.
One California court made the following observation in 1987:
At the core of the dispute before us is a fundamental disagreement over
the purposes of the Juvenile Court Law. Prior to the amending of
section 202, California courts have [sic] consistently held that
"[j]uvenile commitment proceedings are designed for the purposes of
rehabilitation and treatment, not punishment."
In 1984, the Legislature replaced the provisions of section 202 with
new language which emphasized different priorities for the juvenile
justice system. The new provisions recognized punishment as a
rehabilitative tool. Section 202 also shifted its emphasis from a
primarily less restrictive alternative approach oriented towards the
benefit of the minor to the express "protection and safety of the
public."
60. In re Rodney H., 861 N.E.2d 623, 630 (Ill. 2006) (citations omitted) (holding that
because the state's petition for adjudication of wardship was not intended to inflict punishment,
neither the proportionate penalties clause nor the cruel and unusual punishment clause apply).
61. State v. J.H., 978 P.2d 1121, 1124-30 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999) (summarizing 1997
amendments to the state's Juvenile Justice Act and noting that section 13.40.010(2) and other
provisions of the Act continued to emphasize the needs of the child over punishment).
62. State v. Tai N., 113 P.3d 19, 22 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005) (citations omitted). The court
made another important observation in vacating Tai N.'s lengthy confinement. In rejecting the
juvenile court's disposition, the appellate court noted that the juvenile disposition should reflect
"not only the need to hold juveniles responsible for their offenses, but also the continuing
rehabilitative goals of the juvenile justice system and the policy of responding to the individual
needs of offenders." Id. at 25 (citations omitted).
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Thus, it is clear that the Legislature intended to place greater emphasis
on punishment for rehabilitative purposes and on a restrictive
commitment as a means of protecting the public safety. This
interpretation by no means loses sight of the "rehabilitative objectives"
of the Juvenile Court Law. Because commitment to CYA [California
Youth Authority] cannot be based solely on retribution grounds, there
must continue to be evidence demonstrating (1) probable benefit to the
minor and (2) that less restrictive alternatives are ineffective or
inappropriate.
Even when the United States Supreme Court insisted upon basic due process
protections for accused youth in In re Gault, in 1967, the Court took pains not
to dismantle those features of juvenile court that were conducive to
rehabilitation. 64 The Court recognized that the appearance and actuality of
fairness, impartiality, and orderliness in the juvenile court may be just as, if not
more, therapeutic for the child than rehabilitative programming. 65 Research
suggests that when children believe the legal system has treated them with
fairness, respect, and dignity, they are more inclined to accept the court's
treatment plan and engage in the process of reform. 66 When children perceive
legal rules, procedures, and actors as unfair, they have less respect for the law
and legal authorities and may be less likely to accept judicial interventions.67
More recently, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the viability of rehabilitation
for juveniles when it explicitly endorsed scientific conclusions about the
differences between adults and adolescents. 68 In 2005, the Court accepted that
"a greater possibility exists that a minor's character deficiencies will be
reformed.' '69 Because the character of a juvenile is less "fixed" than that of an
adult, the Court concluded that it would be inappropriate to treat a juvenile as if
he were of "irretrievably" depraved character. 70
63. In re Michael D., 234 Cal. Rptr. 103, 104-05 (Ct. App. 1987) (analyzing impact of
amendments to juvenile court).
64. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 22-24 (1967) (allowing states to preserve confidential
juvenile hearings and not disqualify youth from civil service); see also Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S.
253, 263 (1984) (recognizing that the Constitution does not mandate elimination of all differences
in the treatment of juveniles and trying to strike a balance between the "informality" and
"flexibility" that characterize juvenile proceedings and "fundamental fairness" demanded by the
Due Process Clause).
65. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 26.
66. See Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Civil Commitment Hearing,
10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 37, 46-47 (1999) (discussing research on the psychology of
procedural justice in legal proceedings); In re Amendment to Rules of Juvenile Procedure, 804
So.2d 1206, 1211 (Fla. 2001) (reviewing Professor Bruce Winick's view that the "child's
perception as to whether he or she is being listened to and whether his or her opinion is respected
and counted is integral to the child's behavioral and psychological progress" and applying that
principle to civil commitment hearings for juveniles in need of treatment).
67. Id.
68. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005).
69. Id.
70. See id. (banning death penalty for youth who committed crime before the age of
2009]
CALIFORNIA LA W REVIEW
Although research in developmental psychology cannot provide an exact
age at which youth are no longer amenable to treatment, judgments about
amenability can be made on an individual basis, by evaluating a child's socio-
environmental circumstances, psychological state, and responses to prior
interventions. 7 1 Several features of adolescence make youth particularly
amenable to rehabilitation. First, evidence suggests that adolescents
demonstrate considerable plasticity in response to environmental change.72
Thus, positive changes in the family, peer group, school, and other settings may
influence the child's course of development.73 Adolescence is also a time when
individuals experience significant and rapid change in their intellectual
capacities. 74 Cognitive reasoning and intellectual functioning improve as the
brain evolves and as youth gain more real-life opportunities to weigh and
evaluate competing options. As a result, most youth will mature out of criminal
behavior between the teenage years and young adulthood.75
As long as rehabilitation remains an important and viable objective in the
juvenile justice system, legislators must carefully consider how victims' rights
will advance or undermine this objective. Unfortunately, the legislative record
in many states suggests that rehabilitation was not carefully considered by state
policymakers in the drafting of victims' rights legislation for juvenile courts.76
E. Legislative History: The Failure of State Victims' Rights Statutes to
Adequately Consider the Goal of Youth Offender Rehabilitation
A study of the legislative record from a few representative states reveals
little meaningful discussion about the differences between juvenile and adult
offenders when policymakers extended rights to victims of juvenile
delinquency. Legislators, for example, did not explicitly contemplate how
victim impact statements or other victims' rights would affect--either
positively or negatively-the rehabilitative efforts on behalf of accused youth.
Instead, legislators generally offered two reasons for extending victims' rights
to juvenile court: a desire to provide equity for victims in each system and a
belief that juvenile crime was rising.77 The legislative record further suggests
that policymakers faced considerable pressure to extend rights from victims'
eighteen).
71. See Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth Cauffman, The Elephant in the Courtroom: A
Developmental Perspective on the Adjudication of Youthful Offenders, 6 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L.
389,411-14(1999).
72. Id. See also Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth Cauffman, A Developmental Perspective
on Serious Juvenile Crime: When Should Juveniles Be Treated as Adults?, 63 FED. PROBATION 52,
53 (1999).
73. Steinberg & Cauffinan, supra note 72, at 53.
74. Id. at 53.
75. See Scott & Grisso, supra note 24, at 154, 188 (noting that "only a small group of
young offenders will persist in a life of crime" as adults).
76. See infra Part I.E.
77. See infra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
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advocates and community leaders concerned about public safety and juvenile
crime.
A few case examples demonstrate these conclusions. In Idaho, the
legislature significantly expanded the rights afforded to victims of adult crime
between 1985 and 1994 by amending the criminal code to increase restitution
for victims and provide an array of additional rights to victims of felonies.
78
There was no recorded discussion of juvenile delinquency in the hearings
convened in connection with these early amendments. In 1994, however, the
legislature proposed to amend the state constitution to extend rights to victims
of all crimes committed by an adult and felonies committed by a juvenile. 79 The
constitutional amendment was ratified in 199480 and followed by another
statutory amendment to the criminal code that fully extended rights to victims
of felonies committed by juveniles. 81 Several witnesses, including victims of
juvenile crime, testified during the House and Senate Judiciary committee
meetings that preceded the 1995 amendments. One citizen, who complained
about delay in the prosecution of a juvenile offender who molested her two
children, was frustrated that nothing happened in the case until she became
involved. 82 She urged that laws be amended to require notice and case updates
for victims of juvenile crime. 83 The constitutional amendment and related
statutory amendments appeared to be the product of zealous lobbying by
victims and victims' advocates. In response to media claims that he was
pushing the bill to bolster his run for the governor's seat,84 the Idaho Attorney
General claimed the amendments stemmed from a series of statewide crime
victim hearings and from a committee comprised of prosecutors, sheriffs, court
clerks, police chiefs, members of the department of corrections, individual
victims, and victim advocacy groups. 85 There is no discussion or debate in the
recorded testimony about the possible implications of victims' rights for the
rehabilitation of juveniles.
Similarly, in Connecticut, the first victims' rights statute was enacted in
1978 without any discussion of victims of juvenile crime.86 In 1995, the
78. See An Act Relating to Victims' Rights in a Criminal Action, S.B. 1051, 48th Leg., I st
Reg. Sess. (Idaho 1985) (adding the right to be consulted during the preparation of the presentence
report, to address the court at the defendant's sentencing, and to be informed of the disposition of
the case); An Act Relating to Crime Victims' Rights, H. B. 235, 1st Reg. Sess. (Idaho 1989).
79. See H.R.J. Res. 16, 52d. Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Idaho 1994).
80. See IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 22 (1994).
81. See H.B. 175, 53d Leg., Ist Reg. Sess. (Idaho 1995) (introduced to bring Idaho Code
section 19-5306 into accord with the 1994 constitutional amendment).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Foster Don Kunz, Sr., Letter to the Editor, Pass Victims' Rights Plan, IDAHO
STATESMAN, Feb. 26, 1994, at A9.
85. Larry Echohawk, Victims' Rights Now, Balance the Scales of Justice (on file with
author).
86. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-201 (West 2001).
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Connecticut General Assembly amended Connecticut General Statute section
54-201 to redefine "crime" to include acts committed by juveniles. 87 In support
of that amendment, many victims' rights advocates testified about their need
for information and advocacy in the justice system and the victims' need for
safety and financial recovery after crime. 88 Victims' advocates complained that
confidentiality laws in juvenile court prohibited the Office of Victims' Services
from notifying victims about the incarceration status of juvenile offenders. 89
Although advocates acknowledged the need for continued confidentiality for
juveniles who commit minor offenses, no discussion occurred about whether
victims' rights might affect the rehabilitative prospects for juveniles who
commit felonies. The Assembly ultimately concluded that the juvenile justice
system, which was designed "50 years ago for shoplifters and kids who skip
school," must change to reflect the presence of murderers and drug addicts in
the system.
90
In Michigan, rights were extended to victims of juvenile crime in 1989,
four years after victims' rights legislation was included in the state criminal
code.91 Acknowledging significant differences between the criminal and
juvenile justice systems in 1985, Michigan legislators declined to include
victims ofjuvenile delinquency in initial victims' rights statutes but expressed a
willingness to amend the juvenile code to accommodate those victims in the
92future. Legislators first recognized that procedural barriers, such as
confidentiality protections for accused youth, would need to be lifted to
facilitate victims' rights in juvenile court. 93 The legislators also acknowledged
the juvenile court's focus on rehabilitation and noted that juvenile justice
terminology traditionally used to avoid criminalizing delinquent behavior
would have to be revised to conform to victims' rights language in the adult
system.94 Legislators further recognized that because different agencies would
be responsible for implementing and enforcing victims' rights in juvenile court,
those agencies would need to be identified and incorporated into the
87. 1995 Conn. Acts 95-175 (Reg. Sess.).
88. See Crime Victim Issues: Before the J. Comm. on the Judiciary, 1995 Gen. Assem.,
Reg. Sess. (Conn. 1995), available at http://search.cga.state.ct.us/dtSearch.asp?cmd=
getdoc&Docld=5465&Index=I%3azindex\1995 (statements of Carol Watkins, Director of the
Office of Victims Services, Cathleen Edwards, Prosecutor for Juvenile Services, and Keith
Sweeney, Investigator for the Prosecutor's Office).
89. See id.
90. Matthew Kauffman, A Trouble System for Troubling Children; Lawmakers Aim to Fix
Juvenile Justice System, HARTFORD COURANT, Apr. 23 1995, at At.
91. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 780.781-801 (West 2007); H.R. 4240, 83d Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Mich. 1987) (introduced March 5, 1987 and codified as MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§
780.781-801 (West 1988)).
92. See William Van Regenmorter, Crime Victims' Rights-A Legislative Perspective, 17
PEPP. L. REv. 59, 70-72 (1989).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 71.
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legislation.9
5
In 1989, Michigan legislators made all of the statutory changes necessary
to accommodate victims' rights in the juvenile justice system with little
additional discussion or analysis. Despite their more extended discussion in
1985, drafters of the later legislation did not contemplate how the final victims'
rights provisions would affect rehabilitative efforts on behalf of juveniles.
Although the statutory provisions for victims of juvenile crime reflected some
procedural differences, the substantive rights provided to those victims were
consistent with the rights afforded to victims of adult crime. 96 It appears that
Michigan legislators simply waited until there was a proven track record in the
criminal justice system before extending rights to victims of juvenile
delinquency.97 The legislative history further suggests a belief that a significant
number of serious crimes were being committed by youth motivated the
decision to codify victims' rights in juvenile court. 98
The District of Columbia stands out among other jurisdictions in its
examination of the impact of victims' rights on the special features of juvenile
court. The District's city council first adopted extensive victims' rights
legislation in 1989 to protect the rights and interests of victims of crime
committed by adults. 99 There is no record of any discussion of juvenile
delinquency in the history of the 1989 legislation and its subsequent
amendments. Victims' rights were not introduced into juvenile court until 2004,
almost fifteen years later. In 2003, the mayor introduced the Omnibus Juvenile
Justice Victims' Rights Act to "redress an inequity in the current law, which
failed to recognize the rights of victims and witnesses who have suffered at the
hands of a juvenile offender."100 The victims' rights provisions were introduced
in a larger juvenile justice package that not only sought to secure rights for
victims, but also sought to broadly erode juvenile confidentiality by making
juvenile court records, social records, and law enforcement records available to
95. Id. at 70-71.
96. See id. at 71-72; In re McEvoy, 704 N.W.2d 78, 84 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005) ("[C]ourts'
interpretation of provisions in the [Crime Victim's Rights Act] are properly applied to statutory
interpretation of substantively identical corresponding provisions in the juvenile code.").
97. See Regenmorter, supra note 93, at 69.
98. Id. at 69-70.
99. See D.C. CODE § 23-103 (2001). D.C. CODE § 23-103 was initially introduced on
January 28, 1987 as Bill B7-72, the "Victims Rights Act of 1987," by Councilmember John A.
Wilson and referred to the Judiciary Committee "to provide victims of violent crime with the
opportunity to file a victim impact statement and to require a sentencing court to consider a victim
impact statement as part of the record prior to sentencing." There is no mention ofjuveniles in the
sub or full committee report available in the legislative history documents. See Introduction ofB7-
72; Judiciary Committee of the Council of DC for B7-72 presented June 8, 1988.
100. Letter from Mayor Anthony Williams to Chairwoman Linda Cropp, Introduction of
Bill 15-537, Omnibus Juvenile Justice, Victim's Rights and Parental Participation Act of 2003
(Oct. 31, 2003), http://www.dccouncil.washington.dc.us/images/00001/20031120154358.pdf (last
visited July 4, 2007) [hereinafter Letter from Mayor].
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identified District agencies. 10 1 Before the legislation was passed, several local
and regional child advocates testified before the city council. 102 Because
confidentiality was the central question in the debate, testimony about victims'
rights was closely tied to other confidentiality provisions. The advocates
expressed concerns about the dangers of disseminating personal and sensitive
social information about the accused child to victims, a fear that the city
council was responding to a false belief in rising juvenile crime, and a fear that
eroding confidentiality by allowing victims to attend juvenile proceedings
would stigmatize the child and compromise rehabilitation.'0 3 District city
council members were forced to consider, and apparently rejected, arguments
that victims' rights would have a negative impact on the rehabilitation of
juveniles. Although the council was persuaded by public testimony against
broad access to juvenile social, medical, mental health, and family history
records, the council passed all of the victims' rights provisions, including those
granting victims access to juvenile court information. °4 The council noted that
victims of juvenile delinquency need to know if an offender has been detained
or committed and was convinced that victims of juvenile delinquency should be
granted the same rights as victims of adult crime. 
105
The absence of any meaningful discussion about rehabilitation and
confidentiality in most of the legislative histories I surveyed marks a significant
shortcoming in extending victims' rights to the juvenile justice system.10 6
Part II of this Article attempts to fill this gap by considering whether victims'
rights, namely victim impact statements, impede efforts to rehabilitate
delinquent youth. For jurisdictions like the District of Columbia, which did
contemplate the differences between juvenile and adult offenders, I contend in
Part III that victims' rights statutes should be modified to better achieve the
balance sought between the competing interests of victims and offenders.
101. Id.
102. Hearing on Bill 15-537 Before the D.C. Council Comm. on the Judiciary, 15th
Council, Reg. Sess. (D.C. 2004).
103. Id. (testimony of Ronald S. Sullivan Jr. Director, Public Defender Service for the
District of Columbia; Chief Judge Rufus G. King III, Superior Court of the District of Columbia;
and Kristin Henning, Professor, Deputy Director Juvenile Justice Clinic, Georgetown University
Law Center).
104. Letter from Mayor, supra note 100, at 5-6.
105. Id.
106. For other examples of the absence of serious consideration of the differences between
juvenile and criminal court in the legislative history of victims' rights statutes, see the legislative
history of Alaska's victims' rights provisions that first guaranteed rights to victims of adult crime
in 1989 and later extended those rights to victims of juvenile crime in the state constitution in
1994, see ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 24, and into the state juvenile code, see ALASKA STAT. §
47.12.110(b) (2006), in 1996. See An Act Relating to A Victim's Rights in the Sentencing and
Parole Hearings, H.B. 345, 1983 Leg., 1st Sess. (Alaska 1983); Proposing an Amendment to the
Constitution of the State of Alaska Relating to Penal Administration, H.J. Res. 43, 1993 Leg., 1st
Sess. (Alaska 1993); An Act Relating to Minors, H.B. 387, 1996 Leg., 2d Sess. (Alaska 1996).
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I1
PRACTICAL AND THEORETICAL CONFLICTS AT THE INTERSECTION OF VICTIMS'
RIGHTS AND JUVENILE COURT
Juvenile courts have long struggled to reconcile the sometimes competing
objectives of due process and rehabilitation for accused children. 10 7 With the
advent of victims' rights legislation, the juvenile court's mission is now further
complicated by the need to reconcile the rights and interests of the victim with
accountability and due process for the child. This Part looks at the practical
implications and theoretical conflicts that surface when victims' rights intersect
with the child's rights in juvenile court. Specifically, this Part examines how
victim impact statements introduce a retributive element at the disposition
phase of a juvenile case and lead the court to over-rely on the adolescent's
apparent remorse or lack of remorse in evaluating the child's amenability to
treatment. This Part also considers how victim impact statements may erode
confidentiality in juvenile court proceedings and compromise the child's right
to fundamental fairness and due process at sentencing.
A. Victim Impact Statements and the Contemporary Victims 'Rights Movement
The victims' right to be heard at the sentencing of a criminal or juvenile
defendant has been one of the most widely adopted victims' rights across the
country. 1° 8 Most victims' rights statutes give victims of juvenile delinquency
the right to speak or submit a written victim impact statement at the youth's
disposition hearing. 109 Victim impact statements allow the victim to have direct
contact with the judge, prosecutor, and adjudicated youth and are the most
visible way in which victims' rights are advanced before the court. Generally,
these statements help the judge understand the full extent of harm, stress, and
trauma the offender's conduct has caused the victim. In some jurisdictions, the
court may even hear victim impact statements arising out of a charge that has
been dismissed if the child pleads guilty to a lesser-included offense or to an
offense against one victim in exchange for the government's dismissal of an
offense against a second victim.
110
107. See In re Gault, 387 US 1 (1967) (attempting to preserve some of the special features
ofjuvenile court while providing due process protections for accused juveniles).
108. TOBOLOWSKY, CRIME VICTIM RIGHTS, supra note 7, at 81.
109. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.12.110(b) (2006); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-385
(2007); CAL. WELFARE & INST. CODE § 656.2(a) (West 1998 & Supp. 2008); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 466-138b (West 2004); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-B:35-a (LexisNexis 2001); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:4A-42 (1987 & Supp. 2007); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-34-02 (1997); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2930.13-14 (LexisNexis 2006 & Supp. 2008); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 11-201(5) (West 1998); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 419C.411 (West 2003 & Supp. 2005); Wyo.
STAT. ANN. § 7-21-101 (2007). See also MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-1511 (2007) (requiring
probation officer to include statement by victim or victim's family in predisposition report); N.Y.
FAM. CT. ACT § 351.1 (McKinney 2008) (same).
110. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-383.01 (2007) (guaranteeing rights to victims of
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Victim impact evidence has been presented in a variety of creative
formats, including photographs, videotapes, and poetry prepared by or for the
victim, detailing the victim's personal, professional, and family life."'
Evidence may include medical records, statements of lost wages or
employment, funeral programs, crayon drawings from children, and testimony
or letters from compassionate physicians, friends, and neighborhood
associations. 2 In some jurisdictions, a prosecutor may even engage the victim
in a question-and-answer dialogue at the disposition.' 3 Victim impact
statements have been submitted by parents, siblings, and other relatives of the
victim. Most jurisdictions do not place limits on the number and form of victim
impact statements. 114 In several jurisdictions, impact statements not only
include information about the physical, emotional, and financial impact of the
crime on the victim and the victim's family, but may also include the victim's
opinion about an appropriate disposition for the delinquent child or the victim's
views about the child's character.115
dismissed counts); State v. Sailer, 587 N.W.2d 756, 761 (Iowa 1998) (holding that victim impact
statements should not be limited to offenses for which guilt has been established, but should be
more broadly construed to enable the victim to fully detail impact of all of the offenses).
111. See, e.g., Hicks v. State, 940 S.W.2d 855, 855 (Ark. 1997) (noting that prosecution
showed video while victim's brother narrated); State v. Koskovich, 776 A.2d 144, 500 (N.J. 2001)
(noting that poetry by murder victim's mother was included in victim impact statement); State v.
Hughey, 529 S.E.2d 721, 732-33 (S.C. 2000) (holding that photographs of victim's body in the
sentencing phase are admissible to demonstrate circumstances of crime and character of
defendant).
112. See, e.g., Collins v. United States, 631 A.2d 48, 49 (D.C. 1993) (noting that
presentence report made reference to fifteen letters from victim's family and friends, four crayon
drawings from victim's daughter, and victim's funeral program); State v. Fleming, 644 A.2d 1034,
1036 (Me. 1994) (noting that letter was read to jury by rape victim's doctor at sentencing); In re
Biechele, No. P.M. 06-2471, 2006 WL 1461192, at *1 n.4 (R.I. Super. Ct. May 26, 2006) (noting
that presentence report included sixty-five impact statements including letters, statements, poems,
and three booklets with a wide array of information, such as SAT scores, work certificates, and
funeral guest logs).
113. See, e.g., Sailer, 587 N.W.2d at758.
114. But see ALASKA STAT. § 47.12.110(b) (2006) (court may limit the number of victims
who may testify if there are numerous victims); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:1844K(l)(b) (1999 &
Supp. 2008) (court may limit victim statements by relevance and if there are more than three
statements, court may limit number read in court; "court may otherwise reasonably restrict the oral
statement in order to maintain courtroom decorum"); OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2930.14
(LexisNexis 2006) (court may redact information in written statement that "is not relevant to and
will not be relied upon in the sentencing or disposition decision" and court shall not rely on new
material facts unless it allows juvenile opportunity to respond).
115. Tobolowsky, supra note 6, at 81; see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-385(2) (2007)
(statement may include victims' opinions on restitution and disposition); CAL. WELFARE & INST.
CODE § 656.2 (West 1998 & Supp. 2008) (victim has right to express views concerning the
offense and disposition); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-2-112 (2008) (victim has right to express "views
concerning the act, the juvenile, the need for restitution, and the type of dispositional orders that
should be issued"); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 61 IA.037-.038 (West 2003) (victim may state what
disposition he deems appropriate and include reasons to support that opinion); N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT
§ 351.1 (McKinney 2008) (when a court finds such information relevant, victim may express
views relating to disposition including amount of restitution); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-34-02(14)
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Arguments in support of victim impact statements reflect the wide range
of goals served by the broader victims' rights movement. Some aspects of the
victims' rights agenda advance the retributive goals of the criminal justice
system, while others simply seek greater opportunities for victims to participate
and heal within the system. Consistent with theories of retribution, some
proponents of victim impact statements argue that such evidence is necessary to
help the judge impose sentences that more accurately reflect the harm caused to
the victim.1 6 Because the criminal sentence is meant to be a "statement of
social concern for the victim for what he has endured" and "a barometer of the
seriousness with which the criminal conduct should be viewed," some
advocates argue that victims must be allowed to describe the nature and extent
of the harm they have suffered."17 Others contend that fairness and justice
cannot be served unless the court hears both the victim and the defendant and
argue that victim impact evidence is necessary to counteract the vast array of
mitigating evidence the defendant is entitled to introduce at sentencing." 
8
Victim impact statements also provide a vehicle through which some victims
may seek vengeance for the harm caused,"19 especially when victims are
allowed to express their opinions about what the appropriate sentence should
be.
Victim impact statements may serve nonretributive goals such as aiding in
the victim's search for emotional healing and reducing the victim's fears of re-
victimization. 12 Victim impact evidence, at least symbolically, recognizes the
victim's status as the injured party in the prosecution and empowers the victim
with an opportunity to participate in the criminal or juvenile justice system.
121
Victims' rights advocates argue that victims, no less than defendants, are
entitled to have their day in court and to have their views considered.
122
Proponents of this view further contend that victims find greater satisfaction in
the system and are more willing to assist the government in the prosecution
when they believe their voice will be meaningfully considered in the process.'
23
Finally, some advocates of the victims' right to be heard at sentencing also
believe that victim impact statements may advance the rehabilitative goals of
(1997) (victim may recommend appropriate sentence); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2930.13(C)(4)
(LexisNexis 2006 & Supp. 2008) (victim may recommend appropriate disposition).
116. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 819 (1991); Bandes, supra note 6, at 362; Erin
Ann O'Hara & Douglas Yam, On Apology and Consilience, 77 WASH. L. REV. 1121, 1124
(2002).
117. PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF CRIME, supra note 19, at 77-78.
118. See Payne, 501 U.S. at 825.
119. See Bandes, supra note 6, at 362; O'Hara & Yarn, supra note 116, at 1124.
120. See Stephanos Bibas & Richard A. Bierschbach, Integrating Remorse and Apology
into Criminal Procedure, 114 YALE L.J. 85, 87 (2004); Robert Mosteller, Victim Impact
Evidence: Hard to Find the Real Rules, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 543, 548-49 (2003).
121. Tobolowsky, supra note 6, at 81.
122. Id. at 82.
123. Id.
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the criminal and juvenile justice systems by inspiring compassion, empathy,
and remorse in the offender.124 Victim impact evidence may in turn help
offenders reconcile with the community by motivating the offender to offer
restitution, apology, and community service.
Although every state now has some statutory provision that allows victims
to be heard before the sentencing of a convicted adult, there has been
considerable opposition to the use of victim impact statements in the criminal
justice system. Opponents of victim impact statements complain that such
evidence injects excessive emotion into the sentencing process, reduces
objectivity and reason, provides a forum for victim retaliation and vengeance,
leads to harsher, inequitable sentences, and traumatizes victims by creating
unmet expectations about how their input will affect the outcome. 25 These
opponents further contend that any probative value victim impact statements
have at sentencing is outweighed by their prejudicial effect. 26 Opponents also
complain that victim impact statements are time consuming, administratively
burdensome, and often unnecessary since victim impact information is already
available to the court during trial or plea and can be reviewed in an
unemotional, sanitized way by the prosecutor at sentencing. 127
B. The Retributive Element
To the extent that victim impact statements satisfy retributive goals at the
expense of other important objectives, such as rehabilitation, these statements
may be misplaced in juvenile court proceedings. This Part examines traditional
theories of retribution and contends that retributive justice does not take into
account the diminished culpability of youth in the juvenile justice system. This
Part further explores the ways in which the victim's emotional appeal may
foster empathy and compassion for the victim while deflecting the court's
attention from assessing the individual needs of the offending child.
1. Misplaced Retribution
While courts have had little opportunity to consider the role of victim
impact statements in the primarily rehabilitative juvenile justice system, there is
considerable jurisprudence from state and federal courts establishing the
relevance of victim impact statements to the retributive goals of the criminal
justice system. The Supreme Court first considered victim impact statements in
Booth v. Maryland in 1987. 12 Recognizing that the victim's emotional appeal
124. Id.
125. See id.; Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 844, 846 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting);
Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 508-09 (1987), overruled by Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808
(1991).
126. See Payne, 501 U.S. at 846 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
127. Tobolowsky, supra note 6, at 81.
128. 482 U.S. 496 (1987), overruled by Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
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may have a significant impact on the fact-finder, the Court concluded that
victim impact statements may "inflame" the listener and obstruct reasoning in
capital sentencing. 129 In excluding these statements from capital cases, the
Court was worried that such evidence would create a risk of arbitrary outcomes
that turn on the differing ability of victims to articulate pain and on the
willingness of some victims to forgive or the desire of other victims to seek
vengeance.'30 The Court was further concerned that victim impact statements
create a risk that sentences will be affected by the perception of the victim as a
"sterling member of the community rather than someone of questionable
character."' 31
The Court's rejection of victim impact statements in Booth did not stand
long. Relying in large part on theories of retribution and culpability, the
Supreme Court reversed Booth just four years later in Payne v. Tennessee.132 In
Payne, the Court accepted victim impact evidence as an appropriate method of
informing the sentencing authority about the specific harm caused by the
crime. 133 The justices concluded that the extent of harm to the victim correlates
with the "moral culpability" of the offender and held that victim impact
statements serve a legitimate purpose of permitting the fact-finder to
meaningfully assess the defendant's "blameworthiness," "personal
responsibility," and "moral guilt."' 34 The Court also noted that the law always
punishes differently for different effects. 135 The defendant who pulls the trigger
but misfires cannot be punished for murder, while a defendant who hits his
target may receive the death penalty.' 36 Both may be equally responsible for the
reckless disregard for human life, but their punishments will vary according to
the harm caused. 137 This reasoning is consistent with classic theories of
retribution, in which the offender deserves to be punished in proportion to the
severity of his offense and the harm caused. 138 The Payne Court ultimately
overruled Booth by restoring the state's right to permit victim impact
statements in capital cases.' 39 State courts both before and after Payne have
admitted victim impact statements in non-capital cases based on a similar
129. See id. at 508-09.
130. See id. at 505; see also Janice Nadler & Mary R. Rose, Victim Impact Testimony and
the Psychology of Punishment, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 419,421-22 (2003).
131. Booth, 482 U.S. at 506; see also Bandes, supra note 6, at 406-07 (arguing that victim
impact statements permit and encourage distinctions about the personal worth of victims based on
race and class).
132. 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
133. Payne, 501 U.S. at 825.
134. Id. at 860-61; see also Nadler & Rose, supra note 130, at 438-39.
135. See Payne, 501 U.S. at 819; see also discussion in Yoshino, supra note 6, at 1875.
136. See Payne, 501 U.S. at 819.
137. See id.
138. Paul Butler, Retribution, for Liberals, 46 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1873, 1879-80 (1999)
(discussing Immanuel Kant's theory of retribution).
139. Payne, 501 U.S. at 827-30.
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rationale. 140
Accepting without critique the Court's analysis in Payne, it is clear that
victim impact statements are legally relevant evidence in retributive and
punitive systems of justice. The Court's retributive rationale, however, may not
justify the admission of victim impact statements at a disposition hearing that is
at least partly, if not primarily, rehabilitative. In a rehabilitative system,
sentences do not turn on the severity of the child's offense, but are instead
derived from an individualized assessment of the child's mental health and
environment and an identification of services needed to reform the child.
14 1
Because the offender's needs are evaluated independently from the harm to the
victim, 142 two youth causing the same or similar harms may have different
dispositions or "treatment plans" that reflect their unique psychological,
cognitive, familial, and environmental circumstances and characteristics.
143
This analysis is not to suggest that victim impact statements cannot aid in
the rehabilitation of delinquent youth. Quite to the contrary, victim impact
statements might be useful in a rehabilitative system if they were appropriately
incorporated into the child's long-term treatment plan after disposition. When
combined with counseling, mediation, or other victim awareness programming,
victim impact statements might educate the child on the far-reaching impact of
his conduct, help the child empathize with victims, and encourage the child to
conform to social norms. 14 4 In current practice, however, most victim impact
statements are presented to the judge at the child's disposition hearing before
the child's treatment plan has been developed and implemented. Given
evidence that suggests that the courtroom may not be an environment
conducive to fostering empathy and remorse in the child, 14 5 victim impact
statements are not currently used in a way that will effectively rehabilitate
juveniles.
While the mission of juvenile court is not primarily retributive, it is not
purely rehabilitative either. The tension and ambiguity in the goals of the
juvenile justice system make it particularly difficult to evaluate the role of
140. See, e.g., State v. Wilson, 669 A.2d 766, 770 (Me. 1996) ("[W]idespread grief and
outrage are evidence of harm caused by the defendant to... the community .... ); Haley v. State,
173 S.W.3d 510, 517 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) ("Victim-impact evidence... may be admissible at
[sentencing] when that evidence has some bearing on the defendant's personal responsibility and
moral culpability." (quoting Salazar v. State, 90 S.W.3d 330, 335 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003))); Bitz
v. State, 78 P.3d 257, 262 (Wyo. 2003) (holding that purpose of victim impact statement was to
permit sentencing court to consider harm caused by defendant's crime).
141. See Richard C. Boldt, Rehabilitative Punishment and the Drug Treatment Court
Movement, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 1205, 1224, 1271 (1998) (discussing evolution of rehabilitative
courts in America and application of rehabilitative philosophy to drug and juvenile courts).
142. Although the victim's harm is not at the center of the rehabilitative system, the victim
may still be vindicated by the child's admission of guilt in a plea or the court's finding of the
defendant's guilt at trial.
143. See Steinberg & Cauffrnan, supra note 71, at4l1-14.
144. See discussion infra Part IIC, notes 266-285 and accompanying text.
145. See discussion infra Part IIC, notes 262-263 and accompanying text.
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victim impact statements in the juvenile justice system. As discussed in Part I,
accountability, public safety, victim participation, and community restoration
are all goals that compete with rehabilitation in contemporary juvenile
courts. 146 Moreover, although few states include the word "punishment" in their
juvenile justice statutes, 147 some appellate courts have held that punishment
that fits the crime can be rehabilitative. 148 Unfortunately, juvenile justice
statutes do not define terms like "accountability" and "punishment," and
judges, practitioners, and policymakers have a difficult time ferreting out these
concepts in the theory and practice of juvenile court.
Although the term "accountable" appears far more often in juvenile
statutes than "punishment," it is not clear how accountability should be
achieved and whether legislators mean for accountability to differ from our
traditional understanding of punishment. Dictionary definitions of "account,"
"accountable," and "accountability" suggest three things: (1) the offender must
accept responsibility for his conduct, 149 (2) the offender must give a statement
of reasons, causes, or motives to explain his conduct,150 and (3) the offender
must be willing to suffer the consequences of failing to meet an obligation to
another.' 5 ' Thus, the concept of "accountability" includes an emphasis on
accepting and explaining the conduct, while "punishment" focuses solely on
the imposition of a penalty for an offense or violation.152 It is not clear whether
juvenile court practice draws this distinction in any meaningful way. The
preference for the term "accountability" may be little more than an attempt to
soft pedal the introduction of retributivist goals into juvenile court.
146. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text; see also In re S.K., 587 N.W.2d 740,
742 (S.D. 1999) (recognizing that public safety must be sought whether by rehabilitation or
incarceration and noting that while rehabilitation is the preferred route in dealing with juveniles, it
cannot be accomplished in all cases).
147. But see CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-121 (West 2004); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.01
(West 2006 & Supp. 2008); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 57 1-1 (LexisNexis 2005); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 15, § 3002 (2003).
148. See, e.g., In re Michael D., 234 Cal. Rptr. 103, 104-05 (Ct. App. 1987) (recognizing
punishment as a rehabilitative tool under revised juvenile justice statutes); In re L.J., 546 A.2d
429, 439-40 (D.C. 1988) (noting that judges can "contribute to the rehabilitation of a delinquent
by teaching him that conduct does have consequences"); In re Caldwell, 666 N.E.2d 1367, 1368
(Ohio 1996) ("Punishment is not the goal of the juvenile system, except as necessary to direct the
child toward the goal of rehabilitation."); In re Anderson, 748 N.E.2d 67, 70 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001)
(same).
149. Merriam-Webster Online, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/accountability
(last visited Feb. 22, 2009).
150. Merriam-Webster Online, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/account (last
visited Feb 14, 2008).
151. Merriam-Webster Online, http://www.merriam-webster.com/thesaurus/accountable
(last visited Feb. 14, 2008).
152. Merriam-Webster Online, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/punishing
(last visited Feb 15, 2008) (defining punishing to impose a penalty on a fault, offense or
violation).
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To complicate matters even further, judges and practitioners disagree
about where to draw the line between rehabilitation and punishment or
accountability.' 53 The courts' perceptions of punishment and rehabilitation
have varied according to the factual context and the collateral issues at stake.
For example, in Washington, an appellate court concluded in 2004 that juvenile
courts had become punitive enough to warrant due process safeguards such as
the right against self-incrimination for youth at a disposition hearing,' 54 but
held in 2005 that juvenile courts had not become so punitive as to guarantee
juveniles a Sixth Amendment right to jury trials. 55 All of these uncertainties
create a vague duality in the mission of the juvenile court system, and juvenile
judges have tried their best, with little uniformity, to accommodate both
punishment and rehabilitation in the disposition of juvenile cases. 156 Accepting
that accountability, punishment, and rehabilitation all now have some place in
juvenile court, two questions remain: (1) Do judges need victim impact
statements to hold the child accountable or to impose an appropriate
punishment in the juvenile justice system? and (2) If so, do victim impact
statements introduced at a juvenile disposition so undermine the companion
goal of rehabilitation that the costs of these statements outweigh their value in
juvenile court?
As discussed above, if their proponents are right, victim impact statements
provide the court with the most reliable method for measuring harm caused by
153. Compare In re David T., No. H024334, 2003 WL 1914164, at *8 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr.
18, 2003) (rejecting minor's claim that judge "was so preoccupied with the gravity of the offenses
and the impact on the victims that [he] . . . based [the disposition] primarily on retributive
grounds," and finding that the trial court had properly focused on the need to rehabilitate the child
and that punishment is appropriate so long as it is rehabilitative), rev'd on other grounds, 2004
WL 505254 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 16, 2004), and State v. B.C., No. 24800-4-11, 2007 WL 1822403,
at *7 (Wash. Ct. App. June 26, 2007) (affirming goal of juvenile court to rehabilitate and not
punish, but denying child's claim that disposition of eighty hours of community service,
restitution, twenty-four hours of community supervision, thirty days of confinement and twelve to
eighteen weeks of sex-offender treatment was punitive), with E.H. v. State, 764 N.E.2d 681, 685
(Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (noting that goal of juvenile system is to rehabilitate and not punish, and
finding that the one-year commitment was punitive and did "not further the rehabilitative goals of
the juvenile justice system"), and State v. Tai N., 113 P.3d 19, 24-25 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005)
(finding that manifest injustice disposition of twenty to twenty-four weeks beyond the standard
range of zero to thirty days was not justified as the judge did not articulate how disposition
addressed any rehabilitative need).
154. See State v. Diaz-Cardona, 98 P.3d 136, 140 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004) (rejecting state's
argument that the rehabilitative nature of juvenile proceedings would justify finding that a child's
right against self-incrimination does not extend to dispositional proceedings, and holding that the
right against self-incrimination should apply because it is now well recognized that juvenile courts
function to punish as well to rehabilitate).
155. See Tai N., 113 P.3d at 22 (Wash. 2005) (holding that "[n]otwithstanding the adoption
in 1997 of amendments to the juvenile justice code that tended to make it more punitive, we
recognized the 'unique rehabilitative nature of juvenile proceedings' as a continuing rationale for
having judges, not juries, decide cases involving juvenile offenders").
156. See supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text in Part I.D., surveying post-1985
appellate cases.
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the child's conduct and allow the court to impose a punishment that best fits the
child's crime. Opponents of victim impact statements, however, argue that the
impact of harm can be determined from other sources such as plea colloquies,
trial testimony, and unemotional summaries provided by the prosecutor at the
disposition or restitution hearing. While it may be true that victim impact
statements provide a unique perspective on the nature and extent of the victim's
harm, I contend in the next two Parts that the introduction of victim impact
statements at a child's disposition hearing imposes two significant costs. First,
these statements hinder the court's evaluation of the child's often diminished
culpability in delinquent behavior. 1 57 Second, they distract the court's attention
from the important goal of rehabilitation by placing a disproportionate
emphasis on the emotional appeal of the victim and any apparent lack of
remorse shown by the child.' 58 Because these costs outweigh the statements'
value in providing the court with important information, I argue that victim
impact statements should be excluded from the disposition hearing and
reserved for pretrial diversion and post-disposition victim-offender programs
that significantly enhance the child's prospects for rehabilitation and are likely
to provide greater satisfaction for the victim. 1
59
2. Accountability and the Diminished Culpability of Youth
The shift to a retributive focus in juvenile court proceedings, brought
about by victim impact statements, ignores the psychological and sociological
evidence suggesting that juvenile offenders lack the mental culpability that
undergirds the retributive rationale of punishment. While the exact meaning
and contours of accountability remain unclear in the juvenile justice system, it
seems relatively uncontroversial to assert that accountability, like retribution,
cannot be measured entirely by the harm caused. Retributive justice dictates
that offenders may only be punished in proportion to their culpability and
blameworthiness.' 60 Thus, the focus in the retributive analysis is first on the
question of culpability and second on the question of harm. Two defendants
who produce the same harm may and should be punished differently if they
have different degrees of culpability. The defendant who accidentally kills or
lacks the mental capacity to intentionally kill will be punished less severely
than the defendant who, in a rational state of mind, intends to and does kill.
6 1
157. See infra discussion in Part I.B.2.
158. See infra Part II.B.3.
159. See infra Part Ill.
160. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002) ("With respect to retribution-the
interest in seeing that the offender gets his 'just deserts'-the severity of the appropriate
punishment necessarily depends on the culpability of the offender."); Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S.
137, 149 (1987) ("The heart of the retribution rationale is that a criminal sentence must be directly
related to the personal culpability of the criminal offender.").
161. Accident, insanity, and intoxication are common defenses to crime. See, e.g., CAL.
PENAL CODE § 26 (West 1999 & Supp. 2008) (codifying the defenses of mental incapacity,
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Theories of accountability should be no different. An offender should only be
held accountable to suffer the consequences that are warranted by his level of
culpability. As noted in Part I, legislators in some states have explicitly
recognized that a child should be held accountable only to the extent
appropriate given the child's age, education, mental and physical condition,
background, and other relevant factors. 162 These statutes implicitly recognize
that accountability may be mitigated by the child's diminished capacity to
make appropriate decisions and act in accordance with social norms.
There is an emerging body of psychological and neurological evidence
that supports a presumption of diminished capacity and reduced culpability for
minors who engage in criminal conduct.163 Research has identified four aspects
of adolescent development-neurological, intellectual, emotional, and psycho-
social-which affect the capacities of youth to process information and make
well-reasoned decisions. 164 Neuroscience teaches us that "youth[] in early and
mid-adolescence ... are neurologically immature."' 165 Brain-imaging studies
conducted over the last ten years reveal that the brain continues to develop
through adolescence. 66 The areas of the brain that are linked to cognitive
reasoning and impulse control develop last.' These neurological delays mean
that youth generally have diminished capacity to plan, organize information,
and think about the possible consequences of their behavior. 68 Youth also have
delayed emotional responses and diminished capacity for impulse control, both
necessary for the rational identification and consideration of alternative courses
of conduct. 69 Psychological research in adolescent emotional development
mistake, duress, accident, and unconsciousness); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-201 (2004) (codifying
the defenses of accident, mistake, duress, and unconsciousness).
162. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
163. See Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, Developmental Incompetence, Due Process,
and Juvenile Justice Policy, 83 N.C. L. REV. 793, 811-16 (2005); Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth
S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished
Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AM. PSYCHOL. 1009, 1011 (2003); Scott &
Grisso, supra note 24, at 141-44.
164. See Scott & Grisso, Developmental Incompetence, supra note 163, at 811.
165. Id. at 812-13.
166. Id. at 812; see also Abigail A. Baird & Jonathan A. Fugelsang, The Emergence of
Consequential Thought: Evidence from Neuroscience, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL Soc'y B:
BIOLOGICAL SCI. 1797 (2004); Jay N. Giedd, Structural Magnetic Resonance Imaging of the
Adolescent Brain, 1021 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. Sci. 77, 80-83 (2004). But see Jay D. Aaronson,
Brain Imaging, Culpability and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 13 PsYCHOL. Pus. POL'Y & L. 115,
133-34, 136-37 (2007) (noting newness and limitations of these studies).
167. See Scott & Grisso, Developmental Incompetence, supra note 163, at 812. But see
Giedd, supra note 166 at 83 (acknowledging that a direct causal relationship between brain
changes and teenage behavior has not been established).
168. Scott & Grisso, Developmental Incompetence, supra note 163, at 812; Baird &
Fugelsang, supra note 166, at 1797. But see Aaronson, supra note 166, at 121 (arguing that brain-
imaging research is still too new to be used in the legal system and does not yet draw a definitive
link between developmental milestones of the brain and changes in decision-making capacity).
169. See Aaronson, supra note 166, at 122-23 (discussing Yurgelun-Todd interview on
PBS Frontline Series, in which she says adolescents rely on the emotional region of the brain in
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suggests that some youth struggle for impulse control well into middle and late
adolescence.'
70
Well-documented research in intellectual and cognitive development
demonstrates that individual capacity for abstract thinking and deductive
reasoning improves through early and maybe mid-adolescence. 71 Yet, even
when the teenager's capacity for reasoning and understanding begins to
approximate that of an adult, there is reason to believe that adolescent decision
making may be compromised in stressful and unstructured situations where
youth have little life experience to draw upon.
1 72
Immature psychosocial development further compounds adolescent
cognitive limitations. 173 In social interactions, poor risk perception and
preference, limited future orientation, and vulnerability to peer and adult
influence all affect adolescent decision making.1 74 Adolescents tend to weigh
potential gains more heavily than losses in making decisions and are thus less
risk averse than adults. 175 Adolescents also have limited life experience and less
concern for the future, leading them "to pay less attention to [the] long-term
consequences" of their behavior and "to focus [instead] on the short-term risks
and benefits."'176 Because adolescents tend to take greater risks, they are more
likely than adults to engage in reckless behavior.
1 77
The Supreme Court has recently acknowledged that juveniles, as a class
compared to adults, have diminished capacity and reduced culpability for their
criminal behavior. 78 As the Court noted in Roper v. Simmons, the
"susceptibility of juveniles to immature and irresponsible behavior means 'their
irresponsible conduct is not as morally reprehensible as that of an adult."' 179 In
decision making); Scott & Grisso, Developmental Incompetence, supra note 163, at 812-14; M.C.
Brower & B.H. Price, Neuropsychiatry of Frontal Lobe Dysfunction in Violent and Criminal
Behavior: Critical Review, Journal of Neurology, 71 NEUROSURGERY & PSYCHIATRY 720-26
(2001) (strong evidence to show that the frontal lobe plays an important role in aggressiveness,
impulse control, regulation of emotion, and executive decision-making functions).
170. See Scott & Grisso, Developmental Incompetence, supra note 163, at 814; Steinberg
& Scott, supra note 163, at 1012-13.
171. See Steinberg & Scott, supra note 163, at 1011-12; Scott & Grisso, Developmental
Incompetence, supra note 163, at 813-14.
172. See Aaronson, supra note 166, at 119; Scott & Grisso, Developmental Incompetence,
supra note 163, at 813-14; Steinberg & Scott, supra note 163, at 1011, 1014.
173. See Scott & Grisso, Developmental Incompetence, supra note 163, at 815; Steinberg
& Scott, supra note 163, at 1012-14.
174. See Scott & Grisso, Developmental Incompetence, supra note 163, at 815-16;
Steinberg & Scott, supra note 163, at 1012-14.
175. See Scott & Grisso, Developmental Incompetence, supra note 163, at 815; Steinberg
& Scott, supra note 163, at 1012.
176. See Scott & Grisso, Developmental Incompetence, supra note 163, at 815-16;
Steinberg & Scott, supra note 163, at 1012.
177. See Scott & Grisso, Developmental Incompetence, supra note 163, at 815; Steinberg
& Scott, supra note 163, at 1012-13.
178. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571 (2005).
179. Id. at 570 (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835 (1988) (plurality
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finding the death penalty unconstitutional for youth who committed crimes
while under the age of eighteen, three primary differences between juveniles
and adults moved the Court: (1) juveniles' immaturity and "underdeveloped
sense of responsibility" that lead to poorly reasoned decisions and reckless
behavior; (2) juveniles' vulnerability or susceptibility to "negative influences
and outside pressures," including environmental circumstances beyond their
control; and (3) juveniles' less well-formed identity and character.' g The Court
concluded that due to these differences juveniles are entitled to greater
forgiveness for falling prey to the negative influences of a home or community
environment they cannot escape.' 81 The Court further recognized that a child's
diminished culpability calls into question the retributive justification for at least
some types of criminal punishment.'
82
As the Court found in the juvenile death penalty context, a strong
"likelihood exists that the brutality or cold-blooded nature of any particular
crime [will] overpower mitigating arguments based on youth as a matter of
course, even where the juvenile offender's objective immaturity, vulnerability,
and lack of true depravity should require a sentence less severe than death.,
183
The Court's assessment of the emotional impact of these tragedies on the fact-
finder is no less true in non-capital juvenile cases. By their very nature, victim
impact statements---offered to counteract mitigating evidence introduced by the
defendant 84--distract the listener's attention from evidence of the child's
immaturity and individual needs in the juvenile courts. Victim impact
statements are valuable in retributive systems of justice precisely because they
focus the listener's attention on the severity of the harm to the victim and the
brutality of the offender's conduct.
3. Persuasive Power and Voice: Empathizing with the Victims'Emotional
Appeal
The real effect of victim impact evidence in juvenile court is hard to
measure in concrete or empirical terms. Given the subjective nature of any
sentencing determination and the number and complexity of factors the judge
considers at the juvenile disposition, it is often impossible to determine how
much any one factor has swayed the judge's decision. In addition, there are no
statistics on the number of victims who actually submit written or oral impact
statements in juvenile cases, and there are no empirical studies documenting the
ways in which juvenile sentences differ in the presence or absence of victim
opinion)).
180. Id. at 569-70 (citing Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993), Eddings v.
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982), and Steinberg & Scott, supra note 163, at 1014).
181. Seeid. at 570.
182. See id. at 571 (finding that retributive justification for death penalty not appropriate in
light of diminished culpability of youth).
183. Id. at 573.
184. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825 (1991).
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impact evidence. Notwithstanding these gaps, state statutes, anecdotal
evidence, case law, and psychological studies on the role of empathy in
sentencing all suggest that victim impact evidence does affect critical decisions
at every phase of the juvenile case.
State legislators have intentionally drafted statutes to provide an
opportunity for victim input at every stage of a proceeding. State statutes often
require the court to consider the victim's input at hearings on the offender's
release from confinement,' 85 the child's competence to stand trial,'8 6 pretrial
requests for continuance, 187 waiver to adult court,' 88 and motions to sever from
co-respondents. 189 State statutes also give victims the right to consult with the
prosecutor at various stages of the juvenile case, including plea and
disposition. 90 While none of these statutes require prosecutors to follow the
victim's preferred course of action, the victim's involvement naturally impacts
the zeal with which prosecutors pursue individual cases. In the author's own
practice, a prosecutor recently refused to dismiss a juvenile case without the
victim's consent although the offense occurred eighteen months earlier, the
child had already received treatment at an in-patient residential facility for over
one year since the alleged offense took place, and counselors at the treatment
facility reported that the child had been rehabilitated and no longer needed care
and supervision from the court. Notwithstanding her own stated doubt about the
child's need for further services, the prosecutor felt compelled to follow the
wishes of the victim, who wanted the child not only prosecuted but incarcerated
in a local detention facility.
Victim impact evidence also appears to have a psychological impact on
judges who must determine the appropriate disposition for the juvenile
185. See, e.g., In re L.C.H., No. 03-03-00687-CV, 2005 WL 2313506, at *4 (Tex. App.
Sept. 23, 2005) (victim allowed notice and opportunity to be heard in the release of a child or
transfer of a child from juvenile to adult correctional facility pursuant to sections 54.1 1(a) and (k)
of the Texas Code). See also supra note 47.
186. See e.g., In re A.B., 715 N.W.2d 767, 2006 WL 469945, at *2, *4 (Iowa Ct. App.
Mar. 1, 2006) (discussing state's argument concerning the juvenile court's finding of
incompetency based on Iowa Code chapter 812 that "findings of incompetency in juvenile
delinquency proceedings ... adversely impact the rights of victims" and that "society ... has
significant interests in preventing juveniles from escaping the consequences of [their] acts by
reason of incompetency").
187. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-414(B) (2007); OHIo REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2930.08 (LexisNexis 2006 & Supp. 2008).
188. See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6355(a)(4)(iii)(A) (West 2000); In re Welfare of
B.A.D., No. A06-1776, 2007 WL 584371, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2007) (discussing
factors for certification to adult court under section 260B. 125, subd. 4 of the Minnesota Code);
Commonwealth v. Saez, 925 A.2d 776, 778 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007) (noting that impact on victim
must be considered in decision to waive juvenile to adult court).
189. In re Welfare ofI.M., Nos. C4-94-1517 & C6-94-1518, 1995 WL 91583, at *2 (Minn.
Ct. App. Mar. 7, 1995) (applying adult criminal rules on joinder and severance to juvenile case
and noting that under section 631.035 of the Minnesota Code severance may be granted "as long
as the court considers the impact of severance upon the victim").
190. See supra note 48.
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offender. 191 Very few state appellate courts have had an opportunity to rule on
the admissibility of victim impact statements in juvenile court. Those that have
ruled on such statements acknowledged the potential for their misuse, but
concluded that "[juvenile court] judges can be trusted to recognize the limited
relevance of the[se] statements" in the rehabilitation of the child. 192 For
example, in Arkansas, the state supreme court found no prejudice in the
erroneous admission of victim impact evidence during a juvenile disposition
hearing after the child had been adjudicated for three counts of negligent
homicide arising from an auto collision. 93 In finding no prejudice, the court
noted that the victim impact evidence had been "unnecessary to impress upon
the [trial] court the seriousness of the offense" as "the judge already knew [the
child] was responsible for the deaths of three adults and a viable fetus."' 19 4 The
petitioner also failed to preserve his claim that the judge imposed a punitive
and retributive disposition instead of one consistent with his best interests. 1 95 In
Alaska, an appellate court held that a juvenile judge had authority to consider
unsolicited letters from the victims' relatives absent any showing the letters
would unduly delay or interfere with the purpose or character of the disposition
hearing. 196
As is evident from these cases, we expect a lot from juvenile judges. In
non-jury trials, we repeatedly ask judges to perform the "mental gymnastics"
required to ignore or compartmentalize inadmissible or prejudicial evidence
that has been introduced in error. 97 Some commentators even hope that judges
will overcome their own individual prejudices and biases through intellectual
awareness and critical self-reflection.' 98 Although we remain hopeful about the
capacity of judges to weigh evidence appropriately and avoid consideration of
extraneous factors, we may ask too much in requiring judges to
compartmentalize the emotionally weighty victim impact statement and remain
191. See Nadler & Rose, supra note 130, at 423.
192. See, e.g., In re M.N.T., 776 A.2d 1201, 1205 (D.C. 2001).
193. See Hunter v. State, 19 S.W.3d 607, 608, 611 (Ark. 2000). In 2003, the state
legislature amended the Arkansas Juvenile Code section 9-27-329 to permit the court to hear
victim impact evidence in juvenile disposition. See H.B. 2457, 84th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ark.
2003) (amending the Juvenile Code).
194. Hunter, 19 S.W.3d at 610-11.
195. Id. at 611-12.
196. See J.C.W. v. State, 880 P.2d 1067, 1701 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994).
197. See, e.g., People v. Williams, 617 N.E.2d 87, 93 (I11. App. Ct. 1993) (stating that a
trial judge is able to consider a codefendant's statement against the codefendant, but not against
the defendant); People v. Moore, 470 N.E.2d 1284, 1290-91 (111. App. Ct. 1984) (finding that
Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), has no application in a judge-tried case because
judges and lawyers commonly engage in such "mental gymnastics" with sufficient accuracy to
protect the defendant's constitutional rights); Commonwealth v. Montanez, 788 N.E.2d 954, 962
(Mass. 2003) (noting that a trial judge sitting without a jury ordinarily is presumed able to weigh
the evidence appropriately and to avoid consideration of extraneous factors); Commonwealth v.
Collado, 690 N.E.2d 424, 427 (Mass. 1998) (noting that the law assumes a judge able to decide on
the admissibility of evidence and then ignore the inadmissible evidence).
198. Bandes, supra note 6, at 371.
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focused on the individual needs of an offending child. As Judge Learned Hand
stated in 1932, asking fact-finders to ignore prejudicial evidence often requires
them to perform "a mental gymnastic which is beyond, not only their powers,
but anybody's else."
'1 99
This Article opens with a summary of State v. A. V.R, 20 in which a
juvenile court judge imposed a sentence of 126 weeks of confinement in a state
facility after reading letters from the victims' families and friends, hearing one
victim's father allocute about his wife's attempted suicide after their son's
death, and considering the respondent's apology. Police reports and witness
statements prepared immediately after the offense "indicated that A.V.R. knew
'right away' that he had done 'something terribly wrong."' 20 1 The probation
officer assigned to A.V.R.'s case also opined that A.V.R. "feels very badly
about what has happened," and the high school prevention specialist who
testified on A.V.R.'s behalf was certain that A.V.R. felt remorse as
demonstrated by his emotional speech at a school assembly.20 2 Notwithstanding
substantial evidence of the child's contrition, the judge remained unconvinced,
and was clearly moved by the enormity of the harm and emotional toil the
offense had on the victims' family. In his final ruling, the judge concluded that
the sentence requested by the government was not high enough to instill public
confidence in the juvenile justice system and did not adequately reflect the
severe impact and tragedy to the victims' families. 20 3 We can only speculate
about whether the outcome would have been different if the surviving victim
had not attended the hearing or if the judge had not been so unsatisfied with the
child's apology to the victims' families. The state court of appeals ultimately
reversed the trial court's ruling, finding the length of detention excessive and
the court's conclusion that the child lacked remorse unsupported by the
evidence.
20 4
199. Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir. 1932) (finding that an instruction
to ignore an inadmissible prejudicial statement from one codefendant against another constituted
such a "mental gymnastic," but holding that the error was harmless) see also United States v. Delli
Paoli, 229 F.2d 319, 321 (2d Cir. 1956) ("Possibly it would be extreme to say that nobody can
ever so far control his reasoning that he will not in some measure base his conclusion upon a part
of the relevant evidence before him, which he has been told to disregard; but at least it is true that
relatively few persons have any such power, involving as it does a violence to all our habitual
ways of thinking."); Lois R. v. Super. Ct., 97 Cal. Rptr. 158, 163 (Ct. App. 1971) (recognizing "a
variation in the degree to which referees and judges can handle the mental gymnastics necessary
to presenting and judging a case"); People v. Ventura, No. 5693, 2007 WL 4170847, at *1 (N.Y. J.
Ct. Nov. 15, 2007) ("Even if the Court could intellectually separate its earlier determination from
the suppression issues on trial itself, that Chinese Wall would come tumbling down by virtue of
the appearance of impropriety that such mental gymnastics would create. This Court and all others
are fallible.").
200. No. 35032-7-II, 2007 WL 1335244 (Wash. Ct. App. May 8, 2007).
201. Id. at*l.
202. Id. at* 1-2.
203. Id. at *3.
204. Id. at *4.
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In Commonwealth v. Saez, a juvenile court judge in Pennsylvania certified
a fourteen-year-old child to stand trial as an adult on charges of attempted
murder, notwithstanding the probation officer's belief that the child was
"amenable to treatment in the juvenile justice system." 20 5 The state's attorney
seriously undermined the probation officer's recommendation by
demonstrating that the probation officer had not considered the impact of the
crime on the victims.20 6 Although there was no victim impact statement, the
court of appeals concluded that the trial court's decision to transfer the child to
adult court was supported by evidence of the details and impact of the offense,
the juvenile's use of a gun, and the child's apparent lack of empathy for the
victim.207 Even without a formal victim impact statement, other victim impact
evidence heavily influenced the court's decision to disregard the probation
officer's recommendation.
In In re Welfare of D.S.M., a juvenile court judge in Minnesota found the
impact of the youth's conduct on the victim to weigh heavily in favor of
extending the court's jurisdiction beyond the age of minority.2°8 The appellate
court noted that the youth was "charged with the serious offense of First
Degree sexual contact and penetration with a much younger boy."'209 The court
"inferred that the appellant was in a position of trust and authority with the
victim" and referred to the victim as the appellant's "stepbrother," even though
the parents of the victim and appellant were not married. 210 The court also
noted that the victim had scarring around his anus and opined that he "may
suffer psychological effects for years to come., 211 Again, even without a formal
victim impact statement at the hearing, the victim impact evidence was found
to weigh "indisputably" in favor of extending jurisdiction, notwithstanding the
child's consistent compliance with prior psychiatric recommendations and lack
of any prior delinquency record.2t 2
These latter two cases suggest that victim impact evidence presented by
the government already weighs heavily in the court's sentencing determination
and often overshadows other relevant factors such as the child's psychological
state, the child's response to prior intervention, and opportunities for change in
the child's social, educational, or familial environment. Emotional impact
statements delivered by the victims themselves can only further distort the
balance between retribution and rehabilitation. Empirical studies provide
additional support for the anecdotal evidence that retributive responses to the
205. 925 A.2d 776, 779-80 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007).
206. See id. at 780-81.
207. See id.
208. See In re Welfare of D.S.M., No. A03-949, 2004 WL 771680, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App.
Apr. 13, 2004).
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
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victim's harm significantly affect individual sentencing preferences.
2 13
Literature in psychology suggests that judges, probation officers, police
officers, and prosecutors are likely to empathize more with those most like
them and best understand that which conforms to their own experiences. 21 4 As
a result, judges who can imagine themselves in the place of the victim are
likely to experience vicariously the emotions and distress that are associated
with the victim's position.2 15
Victims' rights advocates value victim impact statements because they
give the fact-finder an opportunity to exercise empathy and compassion for the
victim. 216 Victim impact evidence not only evokes empathy for the victim, but
also evokes emotion against the defendant.217 Victims' emotions are likely to
range from compassion and forgiveness to anger, outrage, fear, vengeance, and
even racial animus. Victims' reactions may evoke similar emotions from the
fact-finder, and may elicit sympathy that motivates judges to impose harsher
sentences or sentences desired by the victims. 218 Victim impact statements that
communicate greater emotional harm lead to more severe punishments for
offenders, and anger induced by victim impact evidence may lead the fact-
finder to search for rational support for blame or punishment.
2 19
Although it is not necessarily inappropriate for judges to empathize with
victims in a criminal case, 22 emotions that interfere with reason, compromise
the court's commitment to the child's rehabilitation, or cause the court to
dehumanize the accused child in order to show support for the victim are cause
for concern. At least one commentator has argued that victim impact statements
should be categorically excluded because they appeal to vengeance and bigotry
and block the "sentencer's ability to perceive the essential humanity of the
defendant. ' 22 1 Other commentators have expressed similar concerns that the
court's evaluation of the offender may be improperly influenced by racial,
cultural, class, or gender bias, either in favor of victims most like them or
222
against defendants whom they do not understand.
213. See Nadler & Rose, supra note 130, at 423.
214. Bandes, supra note 6, at 375. Bandes accepts a definition of empathy that includes
three alternatives: feeling the emotion of another, imagining oneself to be in the position of the
other, or action brought about by experiencing the distress of another. Id. at 373 (citing Lynne N.
Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1574, 1579 (1987)).
215. Id. at 400 (discussing psychological literature that identifies fear of being in the same
position of suffering as a component of empathy).
216. See Bandes, supra note 6, at 392 (citing LAw's STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC
IN THE LAW 135, 142-43 (Paul Gewirtz ed., 1996) (arguing that victim impact statements "invite
empathetic concern in a way that abstractions and general rules do not")).
217. See id. at 395; Nadler & Rose, supra note 130, at 445 (discussing research that
suggests that wrongdoing activates three moral emotions of contempt, anger, and disgust).
218. See Nadler & Rose, supra note 130, at 446-47.
219. See id. at 445.
220. See Bandes, supra note 6, at 365.
221. Id. at 365-66.
222. See, e.g., Edward L. Glaeser & Bruce Sacerdote, Sentencing in Homicide Cases and
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The juxtaposition of victim impact statements against inadequate
apologies by young offenders exacerbates the risk that judges will impose
purely or primarily retributive sentences at disposition. Power differences
between immature youth on the one hand and articulate or well-coached
victims on the other often produce imbalanced advocacy in juvenile court. As
in any legal narrative, the dominant story will often drown out the other
stories.2 3 In the victims' rights movement, the victim has been portrayed as a
marginal figure worthy of our compassion; however, as one commentator has
argued, the victim can be "immensely powerful and destructive." 224 Politically,
victims as a class carry considerable power in today's law-and-order climate.2
25
Courts and politicians have certainly been influenced by vocal victims' rights
lobbyists as evident in the rapid spread of victims' rights legislation.226 In
individual cases, judges who are forced to choose between competing interests
may well be swayed by powerful allocutions by or on behalf of the victim.
Because adults are generally more articulate, educated, and expressive
than juvenile offenders, there is a risk that victim impact statements from adults
will drown out the voice of the accused child. Even when victims of juvenile
crime are juveniles themselves, 227 the victim's parents or other adult family
the Role of Vengeance, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 363, 372-73 (2003) (showing that sentences in
vehicular homicide cases were harsher when women and whites were victims); Nadler & Rose,
supra note 130, at 451 (discussing Angela Harris's views about the inability of "jurors to reflect
on their own emotional reactions to the defendant in a self-critical manner"); Bibas &
Bierschbach, supra note 120, at 105 (discussing sentencer's perception of remorse); see also
Michael M. O'Hear, Remorse, Cooperation, and "Acceptance of Responsibility ": The Structure,
Implementation, and Reform of Section 3El.I of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 91 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1507, 1555 (1997) (assessment of remorse allows police and prosecutors to discriminate,
consciously or unconsciously, by race and other characteristics); Bandes, supra note 6, at 371, 375
("Our" ability to feel and understand another's pain is "constrained by each individual's particular
capacities and limitations.").
223. See Bandes, supra note 6, at 386 (recognizing that "not every story can prevail, and
the consequences for the loser can be enormous" and arguing that sometimes the dominant
story-the victim's story-should not be told so that the alternate story may be heard).
224. Yoshino, supra note 6, at 1878.
225. See Nadler & Rose, supra note 130, at 453 (suggesting that the victims' rights
movement is politically powerful and gaining momentum).
226. See supra Part I.E for a survey of legislative history. In Alaska, state representatives
explicitly reference the victims' rights movement and the President's Task Force on Victims of
Crime in their decision to pass victims' rights legislation. See An Act Relating to A Victim's Rights
in the Sentencing and Parole Hearings: Hearings on H.B. 345 Before the House Judiciary
Committee, 1983 Leg., 2d Sess. (Alaska 1983) (statement of Representative Brian Porter); see also
Nadler & Rose, supra note 130, at 427 (arguing that the Supreme Court's decision in Payne v.
Tennessee was consistent with the "tenor and goals" of the victims' rights movement when it
overturned the four-year-old decision in Booth that recognized a per se objection to victim impact
statements in capital cases).
227. Statistics from 2004 show that as many as two-thirds of victims of juvenile violent
crime are children. See CARL MCCURLEY & HOWARD SNYDER, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, JUVENILE
JUSTICE BULLETIN, VICTIMS OF VIOLENT JUVENILE CRIME (2004), available at
http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffilesl/ojjdp/201628.pdf.
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members may exercise rights on the victim's behalf.228 Parents of child and
adolescent victims routinely report on the emotional pain and physical injuries
the child has experienced, the child's withdrawal, transfer, or refusal to attend
school, and the parents' own loss of work as a result of the crime.229 When
victims are less articulate or less engaged in the system, many jurisdictions hire
victim assistance counselors or advocates to locate victims, attend hearings
with the victim for moral support, and help victims draft or rehearse oral and
written impact statements. 230 With this level of support and guidance, victim
impact statements are often more powerful and effective than the offending
child's oral or written apology, statement of remorse, or explanation for his
conduct, which are often prepared without the meaningful assistance of counsel
or a parent.
231
Maybe the most powerful voice against an alleged juvenile offender can
be found in statutes that grant local community leaders and neighborhood
activists the opportunity to exercise rights on behalf of the entire community. In
a few states, local neighborhood associations have rights that mirror those of
individual victims, including the right to notice of proceedings, the right to be
present at all hearings where the defendant is entitled to be present, and the
232
right to address the court at the juvenile disposition. In Rhode Island, for
example, any "association or other group of persons" in the community where
the crime took place may file a "community impact statement" providing
information about the financial, emotional, and physical effects of a crime on
the community. 233 Even in states where victims' rights are not explicitly
granted to a neighborhood association by statute, courts have exercised their
228. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-55-185(18)(B) (2003); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
960.001(7) (West 2006 & Supp. 2008); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.500 (LexisNexis 1992 &
Supp. 2005).
229. For sample instructions to parents completing a victim impact statement for a child,
see, Victim Impact Statement for Children and Their Parents, http://ag.ky.gov/NR/rdonlyres/
D2AAl B9A-50A3-4486-A091-0054B l1A9DEA/O/impact statementinstructions.pdf (last visited
Apr. 16, 2009) (Kentucky Office of the Attorney General); Victim Impact Statements for Parents
of Child Victims, http://www.pwcgov.org/docLibrary/PDF/007911 .pdf (last visited Apr. 16, 2009)
(Commonwealth of Virginia).
230. For examples of victim assistance personnel in different states, see National Ctr. for
State Courts, Victim Services Job Descriptions, http://www.ncsconline.org/DKIS/jobdeda/
JobsVictim%20Services.htm (last visited February 16, 2008) (describing duties and
responsibilities for victim advocates, victim-witness coordinators, victim services legal assistant,
victim assistance counselors, victim-advocate volunteer and other victim support staff).
231. For a discussion of limited involvement of lawyers and parents in the preparation of
the delinquent child's apology letter, see infra notes 235 through 242 and accompanying text.
232. See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-385.01 (West 2001); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§ 9401(7) (2007) (defining victim to include neighborhood association); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 61 lA.038(b) (West 2003) (allowing representative of the community affected by the crime to
submit impact statement describing adverse social and economic affects); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-
28-4 (2002) (permitting a community that has been impacted by a crime to file a community
impact statement).
233. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-28-4 (2002).
2009] 1145
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
discretion to admit any "material and relevant" evidence at the disposition. 234
Comments from neighborhood boards generally involve the collective harm of
crime in the neighborhood and provide a powerful voice of condemnation
against the child.
Strong empirical and anecdotal evidence suggests that lawyers appointed
to represent accused and adjudicated youth do not restore the imbalance
between the youth and the victim. First, many children in juvenile court waive
their right to counsel. 235 Second, even when the child has a lawyer, lawyers are
especially lax in preparing for the disposition where it is easy to defer to the
probation officer's findings and reports. 236 Many lawyers who advocate
zealously for youth at trial believe they should act in the child's "best interests"
at disposition. 237 These lawyers may join the victim in the chorus of voices
lobbying for the child's accountability and punishment. Finally, by no fault of
their own, lawyers for juvenile offenders often receive the written impact letter
minutes before it is submitted to the court and generally first hear the victim's
oral impact statement as it is being read to the judge. With high caseloads and
limited resources, lawyers take little time to explain proceedings to the child
and even less time to prepare clients to apologize or otherwise respond to
victim impact statements. 238 Under these circumstances, the child is left with
234. In the author's own experience, representatives from the local Advisory
Neighborhood Commissions have been allowed to submit victim impact letters in isolated cases in
the District of Columbia Family Court, Juvenile Branch.
235. See Patricia Puritz & Katayoon Majd, Ensuring Authentic Youth Participation in
Delinquency Cases: Creating a Paradigm for Specialized Juvenile Defense Practice, 45 FAM. CT.
REV. 466, 470 (2007) (noting that about half of youth in delinquency courts appear unrepresented
and plead guilty to crimes without first consulting an attorney); Mary Berkheiser, The Fiction of
Juvenile Right to Counsel: Waiver in the Juvenile Courts, 54 FLA. L. REV. 577, 581 (2002); Ellen
Marrus, Best Interests Equals Zealous Advocacy: A Not So Radical View of Holistic
Representation for Children Accused of Crime, 62 MD. L. REV. 288, 320 (2003).
236. See, e.g., A.B.A. JUVENILE JUSTICE CTR. & S. CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, GEORGIA:
AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY
PROCEEDINGS 31 (2001), available at http://www.njdc.info/pdf/georgia.pdf (quoting Georgia
defense attorney as saying, "Disposition hearings are really conducted between probation and the
judge. My input as the defense attorney is not required.").
237. See Kristin Henning, Loyalty, Paternalism, and Rights: Client Counseling Theory and
the Role of Child's Counsel in Delinquency Cases, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 245, 260-61 (2005).
238. See, e.g., A.B.A. JUVENILE JUSTICE CTR. & MID-ATLANTIC JUVENILE DEFENDER
CTR., MARYLAND: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION
IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS (2003) (discussing limited contact and poor communication
between juveniles and lawyers in delinquency cases in Maryland); A.B.A. JUVENILE JUSTICE
CTR., ET. AL., MONTANA: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF
REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 28-29 (2003) (discussing "brief and distracted
encounter(s)" lawyers have with juvenile clients in delinquency cases in Montana); A.B.A.
JUVENILE JUSTICE CTR. & S. JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR., NORTH CAROLINA: AN ASSESSMENT OF
ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 29
(2003) (discussing barriers to meaningful contact between juveniles and lawyers in delinquency
cases); A.B.A. JUVENILE JUSTICE CTR. & JUVENILE LAW CTR., PENNSYLVANIA: AN ASSESSMENT
OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 41-
43 (2003) (discussing "excessive caseloads" in Pennsylvania that "prevent lawyers from having
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minimal support and guidance. Even if we improve the quality of legal
representation for children, the lawyer is not likely to compensate for the
cognitive, emotional, and environmental impediments that make apologies and
remorse so difficult for youth in the days after an offense.
239
Parents are often in no better position than lawyers to help the child
respond to victim impact statements. Parents rarely understand the importance
of the victim impact statement in the disposition hearing, and without guidance
from the child's lawyer, may neglect to help the child write or prepare an
apology for the court.24 0 Even when parents do discuss empathy and remorse
with the child, they may not be able to adequately convey the child's feelings to
the judge, as parents themselves experience a wide range of emotions
241
connected to the child's delinquent conduct. Some parents may be angry or
embarrassed by the child's arrest and attempt to deflect blame from themselves
242by joining in condemnation of the child. Other parents may be angry,
defensive, or resentful of the victims' characterizations and presumptions about
their child. These parents may lash out at the victims and exacerbate the court's
negative view of the child and the child's family.
In any case, as greater resources are allocated to the support of victims,
there is a growing risk that the victim's voice will overshadow that of the
delinquent child. If the child's voice is lost in the exchange, the judge will
make critical decisions at the disposition hearing heavily swayed by the
victim's perspective. Ultimately victim impact statements distort the balance
between rehabilitation and accountability in the juvenile justice system when
they pit the victim's harm and potential desire for retribution against the child's
need for services at arguably the most important stage of the juvenile court
process-the disposition. Because there is a great risk that victim impact
statements will lead to the outright rejection of rehabilitation in favor of
retribution at the time of sentencing, this evidence should be excluded from the
disposition hearing. However, assuming that victim impact statements can and
do advance nonretributive goals such as youth rehabilitation, victim
participation, catharsis, and community restoration, I contend in Part III that
victim impact statements are more appropriately introduced in the child's long-
term treatment plan after disposition or in a pretrial diversion program that
avoids adjudication altogether. Accountability and punishment can still be
meaningful contact" with juvenile clients).
239. See infra notes 254-263 and accompanying text for a discussion of the cognitive and
emotional barriers to effective apologies by youth in the juvenile justice system.
240. In the author's experience representing juveniles in the District of Columbia, parents
rarely understand the importance of statements from the victim and apologies from the respondent
in the juvenile disposition hearing. As a result, parents rarely help children prepare a formal
statement for the court.
241. Kristin Henning, It Takes A Lawyer to Raise A Child?: Allocating Responsibilities
Among Parents, Children, and Lawyers in Delinquency Cases, 6 NEV. L.J. 836, 848-51 (2006).
242. Id. at 849.
2009) 1147
CALIFORNIA LA W REVIEW
achieved in the juvenile disposition when judges consider other, less emotional
evidence of the impact of the child's conduct on the victim.
C. The Unreliability ofAdolescent Empathy and Remorse as a Measure of a
Child's Amenability to Treatment
One of the more interesting and maybe unintentional consequences of the
extension of victims' rights to juvenile court is the court's increasing reliance
on the child's apparent lack of empathy and remorse in its evaluation of the
child's amenability to treatment or need for punishment. At the disposition
hearing, victims are encouraged to provide the court-in the child's presence-
with information about the nature and extent of physical injuries, emotional
toll, and material losses caused by the child's conduct. The child's response,
during and after the victim's presentation, weighs heavily on the court's
determination of the child's final disposition.
Legislators, judges, prosecutors, juries, probation officers, parole boards,
and the media all weigh remorse heavily in the evaluation of an offender's
character and the resolution of criminal cases.2 4 3 Offenders who demonstrate
remorse will often receive reduced sentences, avoid transfer from juvenile to
adult criminal court, earn better pleas from prosecutors, and sometimes have
their cases dismissed.244 The child's remorse and apology suggest that he has
accepted social norms and recognizes that his conduct fell outside of societal
245expectations. Juvenile and criminal court judges also view remorse and
apology as early evidence of deterrence and rehabilitation and are more
willingly to excuse a remorseful offender from incarceration or retribution. 46
Judges seem to believe that youth who demonstrate remorse have a greater
capacity to transform and self-regulate in the future.
24 7
By contrast, youth who appear callous and unemotional are considered
likely to reoffend and become candidates for more severe penalties in juvenile
court or waiver to adult criminal court. 248 Youth who fail to make eye contact
243. See Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 120, at 92-94; Martha Grace Duncan, "So
Young and So Untender": Remorseless Children and the Expectations of the Law, 102 COLUM. L.
REV. 1469, 1493, 1500 (2002); see, e.g., People v. Steele, 434 N.W.2d 175, 177 (Mich. Ct. App.
1989) (holding that defendant's lack of remorse could be considered at sentencing in determining
potential for rehabilitation and to support deviation from sentencing guidelines).
244. See Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 120, at 93-94; Duncan, supra note 243, at 1471;
Kimberly A. Thomas, Beyond Mitigation: Towards A Theory ofAllocution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV.
2641, 2644, 2664 (2007) (describing defendant's acceptance of responsibility as a well-
recognized mitigating factor); Christopher Slobogin, Treating Kids Right: Deconstructing and
Reconstructing the Amenability to Treatment Concept, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 299, 310-11
(1999) (citing cases in which child's perceived remorse affects decisions to transfer child to adult
court).
245. See Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 120, at 113.
246. Id. at 88, 94-95 (arguing that remorse and apology serve as indicators that defendants
are "less bad and so need less deterrence, incapacitation or retribution").
247. Id. at 94-95.
248. See Duncan, supra note 243, at 1493-94.
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with the victim, appear to laugh or smirk during the victim's impact statement,
give inarticulate apologies, exhibit flat facial expressions, or otherwise appear
uninterested are deemed less amenable to treatment.249 Offenders who fail to
demonstrate remorse are likely to receive longer and more severe sentences.25 °
As one Minnesota judge stated to a juvenile at the time of sentencing:
I just need to tell you if you were here today showing some remorse
and ready to pay restitution up front, that would be a compelling
indication to me that you are taking this seriously and willing to make
amends. Unfortunately, that is not what I am seeing. That is not what is
reflected in the [predisposition study report]. Instead, what I'm being
presented with is a situation where you showed very little remorse for
what has happened here.
25
'
The Court of Appeals of Minnesota affirmed the juvenile court's refusal to stay
the adjudication and noted that remorse or lack of remorse is an appropriate
factor for the court to consider when imposing disposition.252
A number of scholars have begun to challenge the appropriateness of
using remorse and apology as a valid measure of amenability to treatment or a
fair metric for punishment.253 Not every offender will have the mental capacity
to experience remorse or the intellectual capacity and language skills to convey254
remorse. A child who has limited life experiences or lacks the full capacity to
reason may not have the same range of emotions as a more developed adult.
255
Likewise, a child who believes he had no alternative at the time he committed
the delinquent act may not experience the same guilt as one who understands
249. See id. at 1498 (discussing example of case in which judge relied on child's facial
expression); see also In re Welfare of A.J.S., No. A05-2185, 2006 WL 2675759, at *2-3 (Minn.
Ct. App. Sept. 19, 2006) (noting that A.J.S. contributed minimally and appeared uncooperative in
the pre-disposition interview, which suggested that he did not have remorse or empathy for
victims); State v. A.V.R., No. 35032-7-I1, 2007 WL 1335244, at *4 (Wash. Ct. App. May 8, 2007)
(overruling trial court's finding that child lacked remorse because he did not raise his eyes and
look at the victims' family).
250. See Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 120, at 92 (discussing case in which judge cites
lack of remorse as reason for harsh sentences); Duncan, supra note 243, at 1471, 1494-1501
(surveying cases in which lack of remorse resulted in harsher sentences).
251. In re Welfare of A.J.S., No. A05-2185, 2006 WL 2675759 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 19,
2006) (quoting comments of judge in refusing to grant stay of adjudication and noting serious
impact of the child's burglary on the victims' business and personal lives).
252. Id. at *3.
253. See Duncan, supra note 243, at 1473.
254. See Bryan H. Ward, Sentencing Without Remorse, 38 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 131, 142-44
(2006); Joseph A. Nese, Jr., Comment, The Fate of Mentally Retarded Criminals: An Examination
of the Propriety of Their Execution Under the Eighth Amendment, 40 DUQ. L. REV. 373, 393
(2002); see also People v. Superior Court ex rel. Soon Ja Du, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 177, 181 (Ct. App.
1992) (discussing trial court's grant of a probationary sentence after defendant was convicted of
voluntary manslaughter because the defendant's failure to show remorse likely resulted from
cultural and language barriers).
255. See Bandes, supra note 6, at 368 ("Emotion and cognition... act in concert together
to shape our perception and reactions.").
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the choice he made.256
Reliance on the child's emotions and reactions in the hours or days after
257an offense is particularly troubling in the juvenile justice context. Because
remorse is a type of painful suffering, youth will sometimes "resort to defense
mechanisms" of humor, denial, or apparent indifference to avoid it.258 Other
developmental features of adolescence, including the rejection of child-like
behaviors such as crying, may also block traditional expressions of grief and
remorse.259 Similarly, youth culture, which often requires youth to hide their
weaknesses and project a violent image, stifles guilt and other remorseful
emotions. 26 Given these variables, the child's true emotions likely cannot be
reliably inferred from his appearance or even laughter in the delinquency
context.
261
Physical and procedural barriers in the courtroom further impede
meaningful expression and experiences of remorse and apology. 262 The
courtroom, for example, is rarely set up to facilitate true eye-to-eye contact
between the offender and the victim and does not provide the child with a safe
space in which to explore or experience remorse. The parties, who generally
speak to the judge instead of each other, are constrained by the limits of the
court's time and have little or no meaningful opportunity to understand the
other's plight and emotions. The offending child may also feel embarrassed,
humiliated, or ostracized in court under the intimidating gaze and judgment of
the prosecutor, judge, victim, and even his own family.2 63
As discussed above, judges expect the child to speak for himself and are
either unwilling to hear from the lawyer or place limited value on the lawyer's
protestations of his client's remorse. On the other hand, apologies staged by
lawyers or insisted upon by judges often appear insincere, rarely foster
forgiveness from the victim, and may lead to further resentment by both
parties. 264 An apology by a child who reads a script written or conceived by his
265lawyer is likely to sound rigid and forced. At the same time, a seemingly
unacknowledged victim impact statement may exacerbate preexisting
256. See Duncan, supra note 243, at 1490 (discussing case example).
257. See id. at 1491 (arguing that practice of looking for sorrow in first few hours after the
crime inaccurately assumes that remorse is an automatic reaction instead of something that will be
achieved over time).
258. Id. at 1472; see id. at 1478-79, 1485, 1500.
259. See id. at 1483, 1492.
260. See id. at 1504-07.
261. See id. at 1499-1500, 1506.
262. See Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 120, at 98.
263. Id. at 98 (discussing likely emotions of adult defendant at sentencing); O'Hara &
Yam, supra note 116, at 1176 (noting subjective cost associated with apology).
264. SeeO'Hara&Yam, supranote 116, at 1127, 1139, 1141.
265. See Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 120, at 98; see also O'Hara & Yam, supra note
116, at 1159 (noting that a strategic person understands that he can get away with wrong "by
apologizing after the fact").
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frustration, fear, and alienation for the victim and hinder the victim's healing
process.
Maybe the most troubling aspect of the court's focus on the child's
apparent lack of remorse at disposition is the court's failure to capitalize on the
opportunity to teach empathy. Evidence suggests that an individual develops
the capacity to empathize with others over time through education and
experience. 266 The increase of peer influence during adolescence provides a
significant opportunity to guide youth in developing strong interpersonal
relationships and a positive orientation towards others.267 Community service
and other programs that are attentive to this developmental opportunity may
foster pro-social attitudes such as "an enduring tendency to think about the
welfare and rights of other people, to feel concern and empathy for them, and to
act in a way that benefits them."
268
Some of the more innovative and effective court-ordered responses to
juvenile delinquency have also begun to incorporate empathy training into their
curricula.26 9 Following the lead of the California Youth Authority, a number of
states now teach empathy through victim impact classes that are incorporated
into the child's long-term treatment plan. In 1984, the California Youth
Authority established an "Impact of Crime Curriculum" to help juvenile
offenders recognize the harm they caused to victims, families, and
communities. 27  Adjudicated youth complete thirty-five to sixty hours of
266. See Bandes, supra note 6, at 393, 368-71 (noting that "[m]ost scholars who study
emotion agree that emotions are partially cognitive, and, therefore, educable," and that "[t]he
cognitive aspect [of emotion] allows emotions to evolve with exposure to new information and
experiences"); Duncan, supra note 243, at 1485, 1501 (suggesting that "remorse is an acquired
behavior" and that character is not fixed "until the close of adolescence").
267. See Rebecca Lakin & Annette Mahoney, Empowering Youth to Change Their World:
Identifying Key Components of a Community Service Program to Promote Positive Development,
44 J. SCH. PSYCHOL. 513, 516 (2006) (discussing results of pilot study and recognizing limits of
small sample size and reliance on self-reported attitudes instead of changes in behavior).
268. Id. at 517 (findings particularly true for those youth in early adolescence). See also id.
at 522-23, 526-27 (discussing results from another study in which lower-income youth who
participated in a school-based community service program in their urban neighborhood were more
committed to the well being of others, expressed a strong intent to be involved in future
community action, and expressed greater understanding and empathy for others); Sara Salmon,
Teaching Empathy: The PEACE Curriculum, 12 RECLAIMING CHILD. & YOUTH 167, 172 (2003)
(discussing PEACE program at the Center for Safe Schools and Communities, which drew upon
research suggesting that teaching empathy is an important strategy for preventing and replacing
aggression ); Yael Kidron & Steve Fleischman, Promoting Adolescents' Prosocial Behavior, 63
EDUC. LEADERSHIP 90 (2006) (discussing other programs that may develop "empathy, moral
values, and a sense of personal responsibility" by incorporating these values into the classroom
and fostering a sense of community through teamwork).
269. One innovative program in New Mexico pairs adolescent offenders with shelter dogs
to "foster empathy, community responsibility, kindness, and an awareness of healthy social
interactions." Tami Harbolt & Tamara H. Ward, Teaming Incarcerated Youth with Shelter Dogs
for a Second Chance, 9 Soc'Y & ANIMALS 177 (2001). At the end of the program, the adolescents
return the dogs to the shelter with a letter to prospective adopters. See id.
270. Patrick Griffin, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Developing
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training with victims of crime integrally involved in the curriculum as guest
speakers.271 The course is designed for offenders who have committed all types
of crimes, ranging from property offenses to violent crimes. 272 At least one
study evaluating the Impact of Crime Curriculum found that offenders who
have completed the course are less likely to recidivate.
273
Florida began using the Impact of Crime Curriculum in 2001. 27 4 By 2004,
the program's success inspired the Florida Department of Justice to require all
state and privately owned residential commitment programs to teach empathy
and remorse.275 Program facilitators in Florida use a series of student exercises
and quizzes designed to help youth understand the impact of crime and accept
responsibility for the harm they have caused.276 The program also fosters a
"safe and healthy forum for crime victims to share their experiences" and
facilitates a dialogue about ways in which offenders may begin to restore
victims and communities.
277
While both California and Florida have implemented victim impact
curricula in secure detention facilities, other states offer similar programs to
youth on probation. In Colorado, for example, the Probation Department offers
victim empathy classes through a program called Recognizing Opportunities
for Change.278 The classes rely heavily on visits from crime victims in lieu of
more common methods such as worksheets and role playing. 27 9 Many other
juvenile probation departments across the country have experimented with their
own innovative empathy training and victim awareness programs.28°
and Administering Accountability-Based Sanctions for Juveniles, JAIBG Bulletin 7 (Sept. 1999),
available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/ojjdp/177612.pdf. The California Youth Authority is
now the Division of Juvenile Justice.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. FLA. DEPT. OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, IMPACT OF CRIME CURRICULUM (updated Dec. 5,
2006), http://www.djj.state.fl.us/Residential/documents/mpact-of CrimeCurriculum 1206.doc.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. See, e.g., Victim Empathy Courses in Morgan County, http://www.courts.state.co.us/
Probation/County/Programs.cfm/CountyID/40.
279. Telephone interview with Renee Stewart, Victim Advocate, Recognizing
Opportunities for Change Program (July 18, 2007).
280. For other examples of victim awareness programs for juveniles, see Juv. Domestic
Rel. Ct., Arlington, Virginia, Victim Awareness Program, http://www.arlingtonva.us/
Departments/JuvenileDomesticRelations/JuvenileDomesticReationsProgramsServices.aspx (last
visited Jan. 23, 2008); Texas Department of Criminal Justice Victim Services Division, Victim
Impact Panel Program (serving both juvenile and adult offenders), available at
http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/publications/victim.svcs/VNIPP%2Brochure-updated-dec7.pdf (last
visited Jan. 23, 2008); Youth Services of Southern Wisconsin, Victim Offender Conferencing,
VOC Accountability Group and Victim Impact Panels, available at
http://www.youthsos.org/pdfs/VOC2006.PDF (last visited Jan. 23, 2008). See also Best Practice
Guidelines for Victim Impact Panels within Pennsylvania's Juvenile Justice System,
http://www.jcjc.state.pa.us/jcjc/lib/jcjc/barj/victim-impactpanels.pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 2008).
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In Pennsylvania, the Bethesda Day Treatment Center, which received
recognition from the U.S. Department of Justice as a model agency, designed
its own victim-offender curriculum for youth in the community.2 8 1 The Center
facilitates a group counseling intervention called Victim Offender Awareness
Restitution (VOAR).282 This intervention recognizes that facilitators must first
process and validate the young offender's feelings about his own abuse and
victimization before the child will understand and have remorse for the crimes
he committed and the harm he caused others. 28 3 VOAR courses take place at
treatment centers located throughout the state and are followed up by individual
and family therapy.284 The Bethesda Center has found the curriculum to be
effective in both residential and community-based settings.285
The recognition that children and adolescents are malleable in response to
treatment has been a hallmark of the juvenile justice system. 286 However, by
relying on the child's inadequate responses to the victim impact statement
before counseling, empathy training, or other relevant services have been
provided, the juvenile court makes critical sentencing decisions based on
incomplete data and unreliable assumptions.
D. Due Process, Victim Impact Statements, and the Juvenile Disposition
Concerns about victims' rights in juvenile court involve more than a clash
of theories; they also raise questions of justice, fairness, and due process.
Although rehabilitation was a hallmark of the juvenile justice system at its
inception, the Supreme Court soon concluded that rehabilitation could not be
287implemented at the expense of due process. Thus, beginning in 1967, the
Court issued a series of rulings that ensured due process for youth in
delinquency proceedings, including the right to counsel, the right to confront
witnesses, and the right to have charges proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
288
Today juvenile courts seek to implement rehabilitation within the confines of
289these due process protections.
281. Email from Jennifer Napp, Regional Manager, Bethesda Day Treatment Center, Inc.,
to Latoya Carmichael, research assistant, Georgetown University Law Center (July 17, 2007) (on
file with author).
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. See supra Part I.D; see also Duncan, supra note 243, at 1475.
287. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 18 n.23 (1967) (citing Kent v. United States, 383 U.S.
541, 556 (1966)) (expressing fear that children were getting the "the worst of both worlds"
because they received neither the promised rehabilitation from juvenile court nor the procedural
rights of adult defendants).
288. See id. at 31-57; Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 540-41 (1975); In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358, 368 (1970).
289. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 22 (noting that notwithstanding shortfalls in due process,
many aspects of juvenile court process are valuable, including efforts to shield juvenile offenders
from public view).
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Conflicts between victims' rights and the defendants' right to due process
have been considered at length in legal scholarship. 290 As victims have secured
greater voice in the juvenile and criminal justice systems, the victims' state
constitutional and statutory rights have conflicted with the long-standing
constitutional rights of the accused. The victim's right to a speedy trial, for
example, may compromise the defendant's right to competent representation.
2 91
The victim's right to privacy may also conflict with the defendant's right to
competent investigation as well as the defendant's right to a public trial.292 The
victim's right to be present during the testimony of other witnesses may
compromise the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront the victim in a
fair adversarial hearing.293 Some commentators have further speculated that
prosecutorial independence may be jeopardized by the victim's right to confer
with the prosecutor before critical decisions are made in the prosecution,
dismissal, or plea bargaining of a case.
2 9 4
The absence of procedures for testing the veracity of victim impact
statements raises an additional concern about fairness as it leaves the juvenile
respondent vulnerable to inaccurate and unreliable evidence at disposition.
With the exception of a few states like Arkansas, where victims' rights statutes
give defense counsel an opportunity to respond to any new factual information
introduced in a victim impact statement, 295 most states do not provide any
290. See, e.g., Tobolowsky, supra note 6; Beloof & Cassell, supra note 7.
291. See, e.g., State v. Lamar, 72 P.3d 831, 836 (Ariz. 2003) ("[I]n determining whether to
grant a continuance made in conjunction with a motion to proceed pro se," "[t]he court must consider
the defendant's right in conjunction with a victim's constitutional right to a speedy trial .... ). For
statutory examples of the victim's right to a speedy trial, see supra note 49.
292. See Zaal v. State, 602 A.2d 1247 (Md. 1992) (attempting to strike a balance between
victim's privacy interests and defendant's right to fair trial by denying defendant unrestricted
access to victim's records but requiring in camera inspection of records by court). But see State ex
rel. Dean v. City Court, 844 P.2d 1165, 1166 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992) (Neither the Victim's Bill of
Rights nor Victim's Rights Implementation Act prevents defendant from subpoenaing victim to
testify at pretrial hearing; "[w]hile the Act provides certain safeguards to protect the alleged
victim's privacy and to minimize victim's contacts with defendant, the Act impliedly recognizes
that a victim may appear and testify at a proceeding other than trial."). For examples of provisions
securing victim privacy, see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-413 (2007); IDAHO CONST. art. 1, § 22
(1994).
293. Beloof & Cassell, supra note 7, at 521-24 (acknowledging due process objections to
the victim's right to attend criminal trials, but arguing that victims should have a complete right to
attend even if they will serve as witnesses); Tobolowsky, supra note 6, at 48-5 1. For examples of
statutes permitting victims to attend juvenile proceedings, see, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.12.110(b)
(2006); ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 3; ARK. R. EVID. 616; MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-24-106 (2003 & Supp.
2008); OR. REV. STAT. § 40.385 (2007); UTAH R. EvID. 615.
294. See Tobolowsky, supra note 6, at 60-63 (discussing failure of jurisdictions to expand
formal right of victim to be heard regarding charging decision). For statutory examples, see supra
note 48.
295. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-1112 (2008) ("[Ihf the victim impact statement includes
new material factual information upon which the court intends to rely, the court shall adjourn the
sentencing proceeding or take other appropriate action to allow the defendant adequate
opportunity to respond."). See also FED. R. CRIM. P. 32 (requiring verification of evidence
introduced at sentencing); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-1 1-65(b) (2008) ("In dispositional hearings ...
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explicit method for challenging information introduced by the government or
the victim at the disposition hearing. States also rarely-if ever-require that
victim impact statements be sworn under oath or otherwise verified before they
are read to the judge and often fail to specify whether and how much advance
notice should be given to the respondent before impact statements are
introduced.2 96
The dearth of procedures for the adversarial testing of victim impact
statements leaves this evidence vulnerable to exaggeration and occasional
embellishment, yet difficult to challenge.297 In other cases, the absence of
statutory procedures for the verification of victim impact evidence requires
defense counsel to make a difficult strategic decision about whether and to
what extent to "attack" the victim's character or impact evidence before the
court. The lawyer who elects to challenge the victim's impact evidence risks
making the defendant appear recalcitrant and not empathetic. 298 The lawyer
who opts not to challenge the victim's evidence relinquishes the opportunity to
have potentially unreliable evidence excluded.
[t]he parties or their counsel shall be afforded an opportunity upon request to examine and
controvert written reports so received and to cross-examine individuals making the reports.");
MICH. CT. R. 3.943 (In dispositional hearings, "[t]he juvenile, or the juvenile's attorney, and the
petitioner shall be afforded an opportunity to examine and controvert written reports" and "may be
allowed to cross-examine individuals making reports."); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 709 (2004)
(The court "may limit the admissibility or weight of any evidence which it deems unreliable,
cumulative, or unduly dilatory.").
296. See, e.g., Collins v. United States, 631 A.2d 48, 50 (D.C. 1993) (holding that
correspondence submitted to judge before sentencing was not required to be verified); People v.
Abrams, 562 N.E.2d 613, 618 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (holding that defendant was not entitled to
cross-examine victim on written impact statement since statement was not sworn); In re K, 800
N.Y.S.2d 287, 288 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2005) (holding that evidence in juvenile disposition and
restitution hearing need not be competent, thus hearsay is admissible and respondent is not entitled
to notice and opportunity to inspect damaged property); In re Zachary S., No. L-01-1310, 2002
WL 471732 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 29, 2002) (finding that victim impact statement did not have to
be under oath or subject to cross-examination to be admissible). While most states do not
explicitly require the government to provide defense counsel with advance copies of the victim
impact statements, a few states require advance disclosure of the predisposition report which may
include or summarize the victim impact statement. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-1511
(2007) (requiring probation officer to provide defense counsel with advance copy of
predisposition report which must include statement by victim or victim's family with no time
frame specified); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 351.1 (McKinney 1999 & Supp. 2007) (requiring that all
probation investigation reports be provided to the respondent at least five court days prior to
dispositional hearing).
297. See, e.g., South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 821 (1989) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (discussing lawyer's challenge to the veracity of the victim impact statement as a
"manipulation", if not "outright fabrication", of the evidence by the government, when it knew
little about the unemployed victim and spun an elaborate narrative about personal characteristics
out of limited facts).
298. The Supreme Court in Payne v. Tennessee acknowledged arguments that it might not
be tactically prudent for defendant to rebut victim impact statement, though it was not ultimately
persuaded by them. See 501 U.S. 808, 823 (1991).
2009] 1155
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
The broad discretion judges have in deciding what evidence to consider at
the sentencing further compromises due process. 299 State statutes and appellate
rulings across the country permit courts to consider any evidence that is
"material and relevant" at the juvenile disposition. 30 0 Materiality and relevance
have been read broadly in the courts, 30 and few states limit the number of
victims who may speak or witnesses who may give victim impact statements on
the victim's behalf.30 2 Appellate courts have interpreted victims' rights statutes
to provide only a minimum threshold of admissibility and do not preclude the
trial judge from expanding victims' opportunities to address the court or from
considering other evidence deemed relevant to the disposition. 30 3 Even when
299. For a survey of long-standing and broad discretion ofjudges at sentencing, see United
States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446 (1972) (noting that judge has broad discretion regarding the
kind and scope of information to consider in federal sentencing); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S.
241, 246 (1949) (stating that "sentencing judge [may] exercise a wide discretion [in] the sources
and types of [evidence] used to assist him in determining the [kind and extent of punishment] to
be imposed"); United States v. Morgan, 595 F.2d 1134, 1136 (9th Cir. 1979) (noting that "judges
have discretion to consider a wide variety of information from a variety of sources in order to
tailor the punishment to the criminal rather than to the crime"); State v. Huey, 476 A.2d 613, 618
(Conn. App. Ct. 1984) (noting that "court exercises wide discretion in sources and types of
evidence which it may consider"); Collins v. United States, 631 A.2d 48, 50 (D.C. 1993) (noting
well-established principle of law that trial court may consider wide range of reliable information
concerning the defendant's character and crime in fashioning an appropriate sentence); State v.
Fleming, 644 A.2d 1034, 1037 (Me. 1994) (finding broad discretion at sentencing as long as
information is factually reliable according to due process and admitting newspaper article of
defendant's criminal history).
300. See D.C. CODE § 16-2316(b) (2001) ("Evidence which is competent, material, and
relevant shall be admissible at fact-finding hearings."); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/2-22
(West 2007) (allowing all evidence helpful in determining dispositional questions, including oral
and written reports, even though not competent for the purposes of the adjudicatory hearing);
MICH. CT. R. 3.943 ("[Rules,] other than those with respect to privileges, do not apply at
dispositional hearings. All relevant and material evidence, including oral and written reports, may
be received by the court and may be relied upon to the extent of its probative value, even though
such evidence may not be admissible at trial."); In re M.N.T., 776 A.2d 1201 (D.C. 2001); Ex rel
Lang, 392 N.E.2d 752, 745 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979) (holding that juvenile court's consideration of past
arrests of juvenile found guilty of armed robbery was not in error because the applicable state
statute provided that the judge may rely on "all evidence helpful" in determining disposition).
301. See, e.g., People v. Albert, 523 N.W.2d 825, 826 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that
"[a]lthough [victim's civil attorney] did not constitute a 'victim' as defined in the Crime Victim's
Rights Act . . . a sentencing court is afforded broad discretion in the sources and types of
information to be considered when imposing a sentence" and allowing the attorney to suggest that
defendant was a "pedophiliac") (citing MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 750.520b(1)(a),
750.520c(1)(a), 780.752(l)(i) (West 1998)).
302. See State v. Wilson, 669 A.2d 766, 768 (Me. 1996) (holding that sentencing court
acted within discretion in considering statements from twenty-one members of community that
were unsolicited by the court, including decedent's teachers, neighbors, and a community
minister).
303. See, e.g., J.C.W. v. State, 880 P.2d 1067, 1071-72 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994)
(recognizing that although the public is generally excluded from juvenile proceedings, a court has
discretion to admit individuals who do not meet the definition of victim and to read unsolicited
letters from the victim's family if those actions would be "compatible with the best interests of the
minor," but remanding the case so requisite findings could be made on the record).
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statutes clearly prohibit or exclude victim impact evidence, appellate courts
have been unwilling to find prejudice in the admission of that evidence when
its content was already apparent in the proceedings. 30 4 Defendants have
repeatedly challenged the inclusion of evidence concerning other crimes in
victim impact statements but have found little support in the appellate courts.
30 5
A final concern is the inclusion in the impact statement of the victim's
opinion about the defendant's character and the victim's recommendations for a
specific sentence. 306 The victim's opinions on these issues provide a
particularly unstable and unreliable basis for decision making in the juvenile
justice system. Victims generally have limited knowledge about the
rehabilitative purpose of juvenile court and even less understanding of theories
of adolescent development that undergird that purpose. The victim's comments
about the character of the child are speculative, at best, when based solely on a
single encounter with the child at the time of the offense. Thus, unless the
victim is related to or otherwise intimately involved with the child, the victim's
opinion offers little reliable insight into the appropriate disposition. Moreover,
while anger and vengeance are often fresh at the time of the victim impact
statement, that anger may dissipate after the victim learns more about the child
or better understands the treatment options available to youth in juvenile
court.30 7 It often takes time, and maybe even face-to-face interaction mediated
by a third-party, for victims to overcome resentment and "see offenders as
redeemable human beings."
30 8
304. See State v. Tesch, 704 N.W.2d 440, 452-53 (Iowa 2005) (finding that a juvenile
sentenced for vehicular homicide was not prejudiced by the victim impact statement of the
victim's wife although she did not meet the statutory definition of victim); see also State v.
Sumpter, 438 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1989) (finding that although aunts and uncles were not among the
group of persons allowed to give victim impact statements, defendant suffered no prejudice
because he did not prove the court impermissibly relied on the statements).
305. Iowa v. Sailer, 587 N.W.2d 756, 761 (Iowa 1998) (holding that "the word 'offense'
... should not be limited to the offense or offense for which guilt has been established .... [but]
should be more broadly construed to enable the victim to fully detail the impact of the offense,"
including uncharged and unproven acts which were part of same course of conduct); State v.
Phillips, 561 N.W.2d 355, 359 (Iowa 1997) (allowing victim impact statement to include other
possible offenses in addition to third-degree sexual assault to which defendant pled); State v.
Dumont, 507 A.2d 164, 166-67 (Me. 1986) (finding no abuse of discretion by court in considering
affidavits from victims of other, uncharged crimes). But see State v. Whitten, 667 A.2d 849, 852
(Me. 1995) (vacating trial court's sentence after judge appropriately exercised his discretion to
consider a non-victim's claim that she had been forcibly raped by defendant but failed to
implement any process to ensure the factual reliability of the evidence); Bitz v. State, 78 P.3d 257,
262 (Wyo. 2003) (reversing trial court sentence because the trial court read and considered victim
impact statement from the defendant's biological daughter, who had been previously molested by
the defendant but was not a victim in this case).
306. See infra note 115.
307. See Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 120, at 138 (discussing victim's comfort in
realizing the offender was "just a kid who made a mistake"); see also Nadler & Rose, supra note
130, at 442 (arguing that emotional harm is less reliable as a measure of culpability because
emotional responses vary widely among individuals).
308. Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 120, at 115, 138.
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E. The Erosion of Confidentiality and Mounting Stigma
Finally, the victims' rights movement creates a difficult tension between
the child's statutory right to confidentiality in juvenile cases and the victim's
right to attend hearings, access information, and offer input at various stages of
the juvenile justice process. At the inception of the contemporary juvenile
court, records and hearings were kept confidential to avoid permanently
stigmatizing juveniles who were likely to age out of delinquent behavior.30 9
Confidentiality was linked to the rehabilitative philosophy of the juvenile
justice system since it was understood that confidential proceedings would
allow youth to benefit from treatment and services while being protected from
the stigma of a criminal record that might impede their progress in school,
work, and the community.3 10 Because the victims' rights movement grants
victims and witnesses greater access to juvenile proceedings, the movement
may threaten both confidentiality and rehabilitation.
In many states, victims have the right to attend any phase of a juvenile
311
case that the defendant has a right to attend. Victims also have the right to
notice of the child's release from detention, the right to access of juvenile court
records, and the right to be informed about final outcomes in the juvenile's
case. 312  Granting victims these rights would not necessarily erode
309. See Henning, supra note 30, at 525-27; Emily Bazelon, Public Access to Juvenile and
Family Court: Should the Courtroom Doors Be Open or Closed?, 18 YALE L. & POL'y REV. 155,
155 (1999).
310. See Bazelon, supra note 309, at 155; Henning, supra note 30, at 525-27; see also In re
M.C., 527 N.W.2d 290, 293 (S.D. 1995) (noting that confidentiality promotes juvenile
rehabilitation); In re J.S., 438 A.2d 1125, 1129 (Vt. 1981) (stating that confidential proceedings
protect juveniles from self-perpetuating stigma that makes "change and growth impossible").
311. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 47.12.110(b), 12.61.010 (2006); CAL. WELFARE & INST.
CODE § 676.5 (West 1998 & Supp. 2008); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-5306 (2004); Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 610.060 (LexisNexis 1999 & Supp. 2007); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-7335 (2002 & Supp.
2007); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 11-302 (LexisNexis 2008); Mo. CONST. art. I, § 32; Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 595.209.1(1) (West 2003 & Supp. 2008); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-B:34
(LexisNexis 2001 & Supp. 2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-2402 (2007); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-
34-02 (1997); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2930.09 (LexisNexis 2006); OR. CONST. art. 1, § 42
(2008).
312. See, e.g., CAL. WELFARE & INST. CODE § 679.02(2), (13) (West 1998 & Supp. 2008)
(right to be informed of final disposition and conviction for certain enumerated offenses); CAL.
WELFARE & INST. CODE § 656.2(c) (West 1998 & Supp. 2008) (right to access charging petition,
minutes of transfer proceeding, orders of adjudication, and disposition when child subject to
transfer hearing); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 595.209.1(3) (West 2003 & Supp. 2008) (right to notice of
final disposition in the case); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-215(3) (2007) (right to notice ofjuvenile
felony of filing of petition, entry of consent decree, disposition made, and release of youth from
correctional facility); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§169-B:34, 35-a (2001 & Supp. 2007) (right of
victims and victims' immediate family to access information about child, including name, age,
address, gender, offense charged, custody status, case progress, adjudicatory status, and
disposition); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4B-37 (West 2001 & Supp. 2007) (right to access information
about case progress and final disposition); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-34-02(2) (1997) (right of
victims and witnesses to be informed of status of investigation and criminal charges filed); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2930.12 (LexisNexis 2006) (right to notice of acquittal, conviction, and
dismissal of complaint); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 11-201(12) (West 1998).
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confidentiality if legislators narrowly drafted statutes to achieve the limited
goals of transparency and catharsis for the victim and to clearly prevent further
disclosure of the child's confidential information. Unfortunately, it appears that
current victim access statutes are neither narrowly drawn, nor vigorously
enforced to ensure the confidentiality of juvenile proceedings. Few statutes
strictly limit juvenile court access to the victim or to the victim's immediate
family when the victim is deceased, but instead permit eyewitnesses, relatives
of the victim, victim support persons, and neighborhood associations to attend
and speak at juvenile court hearings in the name of victims' rights.313 State
legislators and juvenile courts also have not been vigilant in crafting statutes
and rules to prohibit victims from disclosing the identity of juvenile offenders
outside of the courtroom.3 14 Even where these additional protections do exist,
they are rarely enforced by imposing criminal or financial penalties on the
victim or other persons who improperly disclose juvenile information. 315
Today, child advocates and scholars writing about the important features
of juvenile court do not uniformly endorse confidentiality. Some advocates
argue that public hearings are mandated by the First Amendment and necessary
to protect against arbitrary decision making by the government and the court.
316
313. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-384E (2007) (allowing minor victim to have
adult representative present at all times); CAL. WELFARE & INST. CODE § 676.5 (West 1998 &
Supp. 2008) (allowing up to two support persons); D.C. CODE § 16-2316(e)(4) (Supp. 2008)
(permitting victims and eyewitnesses to attend specified juvenile hearings); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 169-B:34 (LexisNexis 2001 & Supp. 2007) (allowing victim, victim advocate, or other
person chosen by victim to attend juvenile hearing); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-2402 (2007) (allowing
victim, member of victim's family, or witness to attend juvenile hearing); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 12.1-34-02(18) (1997) (allowing every victim or witness who is a minor to have a spouse,
parent, guardian, and no more than two other designated adults present with him during any
delinquency proceeding); OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2930.09 (LexisNexis 2006 & Supp. 2008)
(allowing victim to be accompanied by an individual for support); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § II -
201 (West 1998) (allowing victim to be accompanied at all juvenile proceedings by family
member, victim advocate, or other person providing assistance or support). See also supra note
232-234 and accompanying text for discussion of neighborhood associations.
314. But see D.C. CODE § 16-2336 (2001) (person unlawfully disclosing information shall
be punished by misdemeanor charge and fine of 250 dollars); CAL. WELFARE & INST. CODE
§ 656.2(c) (West 1998 & Supp. 2008) (person unlawfully disclosing information shall be punished
by misdemeanor and fine of five hundred dollars); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-B:34 (LexisNexis
2001 & Supp. 2007) (making it a misdemeanor for victim or any member of victim's family to
disclose confidential information to any person not authorized to access such information).
315. In the author's own jurisdiction, judges, defense attorneys, and prosecutors could not
think of a single case in recent memory in which this protection had been enforced pursuant to
D.C. CODE § 16-2336 (2005). Quite to the contrary, practitioners noted several examples in which
the child's name had been leaked at a local Advisory Neighborhood Commission (ANC) meeting,
to a school principal, or to a news reporter. The author has heard similar comments from
practitioners in other jurisdictions.
316. See Jennifer L. Rosato, The Future of Access to the Family Court: Beyond Naming
and Blaming, 9 J.L. & POL'Y 149, 165 (2000); Joshua M. Dalton, At the Crossroads of Richmond
and Gault: Addressing Media Access to Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings Through a Functional
Analysis, 28 SETON HALL L. REV. 1155 (1998) (arguing that juvenile proceedings should be
presumptively open to the media and public in order to facilitate systemic reform).
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Others believe that public access could lead to positive systemic reform in the
juvenile justice system.317 Yet, notwithstanding valid arguments in favor of
public access, it is clear that legislators did not draft victims' rights statutes to
protect the First Amendment rights of the media, nor to protect the child's
interests through public oversight. Victims' rights provisions grant access to a
particular class of people-namely the victim, the victim's family, and
eyewitnesses of the offense-who are likely to be hostile to the interests of the
child. In Part III, I propose that legislators rewrite existing victim access
provisions to better accommodate the competing goals of the victim and the
child and urge prosecutors to strictly enforce statutory provisions that impose
sanctions on those who share information obtained from juvenile court.
III
BALANCING THE RIGHTS AND INTERESTS OF ADJUDICATED YOUTH AND
VICTIMS
Not every goal in the victims' rights movement is incompatible with the
rehabilitative goals of juvenile court. Some aspects of the movement attempt to
satisfy nonretributive goals that may be accommodated in the juvenile justice
system. For example, many victims' rights statutes simply require prosecutors
and law enforcement officials to treat victims with dignity and respect and
require prosecutors to be considerate of the victims' time, schedule, and
privacy. 318 Other statutes ensure that victims will be safe in court, avoid
penalties for missing work to testify, and have access to compensation,
counseling, and other services. 319 These statutes do little to advance the
317. Id.
318. For examples of states that require the courts and law enforcement officials to show
dignity and respect to victims, see FLA. STAT. § 960.001(n) (West 2005 & Supp. 2008) (dignity
and passion); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 11-1003 (LexisNexis 2008) (respect, dignity,
courtesy, and sensitivity); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4B-36 (West 2001 & Supp. 2007). For statutes
that ensure victims have adequate advance notice of trial dates, cancellation of scheduled court
hearings, and early termination of the case through pleas, see CAL. WELFARE & INST. CODE §
679.02 (West 1998 & Supp. 2008); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 11-1003 (LexisNexis 2001 &
Supp. 2007); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611A.033(b) (West 2003); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 595.209.1(3)
(West 2003 & Supp. 2008); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-34-02 (4) (1997); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2930.08 (LexisNexis 2006 & Supp. 2008). For examples of statutes that shield victims'
identifying information from the public, see KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2309(b) (Supp. 2007) and LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:1844(W)(l)(a) (1999 & Supp. 2008). For examples of statutes that require
a separate waiting area for juveniles, see D.C. CODE § 16-2340(a)(3) (Supp. 2008); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 61 1A.034 (West 2003); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 595.209.1(17) (West 2003 & Supp. 2008); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 52:4B-37 (2001); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-825 (2007); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-34-
02(9) (1997); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2930.10 (LexisNexis 2006).
319. For statutes that offer victims protection against credible threats, see Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 595.209.1(9) (West 2003 & Supp. 2008) and N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4B-37 (2001 & Supp. 2007).
For statutes that ensure victim compensation and services and require prosecutors to intercede
with the victim's employer, see CAL. PENAL CODE § 679.02(7)(West 1999) (ensuring that victims
receive witness fees and mileage); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611A.02 (West 2003 & Supp. 2008)
(requiring relevant agency to provide victims with information about victim crisis centers, elderly
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retributive goals of the victims' rights movement and are unlikely to impede the
rehabilitative agenda of the juvenile justice system.
By contrast, statutes that help victims participate in and find healing
through the juvenile justice system may pose a real challenge to the goals of
rehabilitation. In this Part, I contend that victim impact statements, as currently
used in juvenile courts, not only threaten to undermine the child's
rehabilitation, but also fail to achieve the cathartic goals of the victim. Because
victim impact statements are introduced in court at the child's disposition
hearing before counseling and other services have been provided, these
statements fail to generate the kind of empathy and forgiveness that is desired
between the victim and offender. These shortcomings should prompt
policymakers to critically examine the timing and format of the victim-offender
interaction in juvenile cases.
This Part proposes that courts and policymakers remove victim impact
statements from the disposition hearing and incorporate them instead into the
post-disposition treatment plan for an adjudicated youth or in the pretrial
diversion programs that avoid adjudication. Recognizing the risks and
challenges associated with this proposal, this Part also suggests that safeguards
be implemented to prevent further erosion of confidentiality in juvenile courts
and to avoid the "shaming" and coercion of juveniles in mediation. The Part
concludes with recommendations that will protect the due process rights of
youth at disposition.
victims project, victim assistance hotlines, domestic violence shelters, and programs); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 611A.036 (West 2003) (stating that employer may not discharge or discipline any
witness or victim for honoring a subpoena); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 595.209.1(14) (West 2003 &
Supp. 2008) (same); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4B-42 to 44 (West 2001 & Supp. 2007) (establishing
victim-witness information program to provide twenty-four hour hotline for questions about
services; requiring prosecutor to assist victim with court information, parking, notification to
work, counseling, etc.); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-825 (2007) (requiring authorities to intercede
with employers, provide witness fees, or victim compensation); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-34-
02(5)-(7) (1997) (requiring prosecutor to inform victim about procedures for obtaining witness
fees and counseling and to intercede with employers on victim's behalf). For examples of states
that require law enforcement officials to provide medical assistance or information about
counseling, treatment, or other services for victims, see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-386 (2007);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4B-37 (West 2001 & Supp. 2007). For examples of states that require the
expeditious return of property to victims, see CAL. WELFARE & INST. CODE § 679.02(9) (West
1998 & Supp. 2008); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-5306 (2004); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 595.209.1(13)
(West 2003); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4B-37 (West 2001 & Supp. 2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-
825 (2007); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-34-02(8) (1997); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2930.11
(LexisNexis 2006 & Supp. 2008) (noting, however, that government must retain property if
juvenile offender asserts that it is needed for defense in the case); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 11-
201(6) (West 1998).
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A. Refraining the Victim-Offender Interaction and Rethinking
Victim Impact Statements
1. Pretrial Diversion and Post-Disposition Strategies for Victim-Offender
Reconciliation
Recognizing the limits of the courtroom to secure meaningful
participation and satisfaction for victims, victims' advocates have identified
other strategies to involve victims in the juvenile and criminal justice processes.
Proponents of restorative justice, for example, have endorsed programs such as
victim-offender mediation, victim impact classes, and victim awareness
training, as vehicles to facilitate both victim participation and offender
rehabilitation. 320 Unlike victim impact statements that are merely read in court,
these programs take advantage of the social and relational aspects of remorse
and apology and encourage victims and offenders to talk and understand each
other's experiences. 321 The mediated face-to-face dialogue allows the victim
and offender to ask questions of one another and gives the child time to
understand and explain why he committed the crime.
322
Victim impact panels and victim-offender mediation facilitate meaningful
contact between victims and offenders, partly by providing trained counselors
to talk with the individual participants before the parties meet. Before victim
impact panels, for example, facilitators explain the purpose and format of the
program to the young offenders and talk about the importance of "posture,
attentiveness, attitudes, and nonverbal facial expressions." 323 Facilitators also
help youth understand how the panel will fit into their larger plan of treatment
or probation.324 Following the panels, facilitators help youth explore and
discuss how they felt during the victims' presentation. 325 These discussions are
generally incorporated into a much longer curriculum of empathy training and
victim awareness activities.
326
Buttressing claims regarding the efficacy of these conferences and panels,
recent empirical studies show that more offenders apologize in restorative
320. See, e.g., William R. Nugent, Mona Williams & Mark S. Umbreit, Participation in
Victim-Offender Mediation and the Prevalence and Severity of Subsequent Delinquent Behavior:
A Meta-Analysis, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 137 (2003) (discussing "victim-offender mediation [as] one
of the oldest and most widely practiced models of restorative justice"). For other program
examples, see supra notes 269-285 and accompanying text.
321. See Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 120, at 88-89.
322. See, e.g., Lisa Sink, Juveniles to Meet With Victims-Waukesha Panels Designed to
Foster Offender Empathy, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, July 22, 2002, at B 1.
323. Best Practice Guidelines for Victim Impact Panels within Pennsylvania's Juvenile
Justice System 7, http://www.jcjc.state.pa.us/jcjc/lib/jcjc/bari/victim-impact-panels.pdf (last
visited Feb. 16, 2008).
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. See supra notes 269-285 and accompanying text.
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justice conferences than in court.32 7 By delaying apologies until after the child
receives counseling, education, or mediation, the child has more time to
appreciate the victims' experiences and internalize moral lessons; thus, there is
a greater chance that apologies will be meaningful and sincere. 328 A delayed
apology can be even more meaningful than an immediate one when it
demonstrates to the injured party that the offender has had time to thoroughly
contemplate and reflect on his actions. 329 Moreover, a trained mediator who
meets with the offending child before the victim-offender conference may help
the child better articulate his feelings and avoid off-putting behaviors such as
lowered eyes and mumbling. Because the victim's perception of the offender
will determine how the apology is received, the offender's nonverbal "cues"
such as eye contact, facial expressions, and body posture are important.
330
Victims who meet with a counselor before mediation may also learn important
information about the offender and better interpret nonverbal signals.
Of course, some youth will immediately recognize their behavior was
wrong and be ready to apologize shortly after the offense. The
recommendations in this Article would not preclude these apologies. 331 Youth
who apologize early may still attend victim impact classes as leaders who can
educate others. These youth may also participate in one-on-one victim-offender
mediation to reinforce the sense of personal responsibility and help victims
understand why the crime occurred. Although the risk of staged apologies may
not be avoided, offenders who attend victim impact classes or victim-offender
mediation before or after disposition may internalize their victims' pain and
eventually experience genuine sorrow and remorse.
Victim impact panels and victim-offender mediation programs not only
capitalize on the child's capacity for growth and development, but are also
more likely to help the victim find closure and healing. Evidence suggests that
victims and communities are more likely to forgive when they perceive the
offender's remorse to be genuine. 332 Expressions of forgiveness and
compassion by the victim towards the child may in turn evoke additional
empathy from the child. Through this interactive exchange, apology and
forgiveness may ultimately restore communities, reconcile broken
327. See Barton Poulson, A Third Voice: A Review of Empirical Research on the
Psychological Outcomes of Restorative Justice, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 167, 189; Bibas &
Bierschbach, supra note 120, at 132 (discussing studies that confirm offenders are more likely to
apologize after meaningful face-to-face interaction with victim).
328. See Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 120, at 87-90.
329. See O'Hara& Yam, supra note 116, at 1139.
330. Id. at 1140.
331. Some scholars have argued that defendants have a due process right to allocute at
sentencing-both in an effort to humanize themselves and in an attempt to mitigate their conduct
in the case. See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 244, at 2649-50.
332. See Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 120, at 132 (noting that studies confirm victims
are more likely to forgive after meaningful face-to-face encounters with defendants).
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relationships, and heal emotional injuries. 333
Even when the victim does not wish to participate in a face-to-face
exchange with the offender, the victim may submit written letters or video
tapes for the offender to view in the company of a counselor or a victim impact
specialist. In the alternative, the court may order the child to attend victim
impact panels or participate in other victim awareness curricula that are staffed
by community volunteers who previously have been victimized by crime. In
response to victimless crimes, the court may order youth to participate in
programs offered by community reparation or neighborhood accountability
boards to learn about the impact of their conduct on the community. 334 These
programs can be used either to divert youth from the juvenile court process
altogether or as a condition of probation.335 Moreover, neighborhood
accountability boards are designed to achieve many of the same goals as the
victims' rights movement. Specifically, these boards strive to increase feelings
of safety in the community, insist on accountability for offenders, provide an
opportunity for victims to participate in the criminal justice process, secure
restitution for victims, and increase offenders' awareness of the impact of their
conduct on society.
336
Although the data is new and quite limited, early evidence suggests that
excluding victim impact statements from the sentencing determination will not
compromise the victim's desire to be heard, to hold the defendant accountable,
or to find catharsis in the juvenile or criminal justice system. Empirical studies
have attempted to compare victim satisfaction in restorative justice programs
with victim satisfaction in court.33 7 Professor Barton Poulson collectively
analyzed a number of these studies, and he found that participants in victim-
offender mediation were more satisfied with the way their cases were handled
than were victims who only participated in court. 33 8 Victims in mediation and
restorative justice programs were more likely to believe that offenders had been
held accountable than victims in court. 3 39 Victims in restorative justice
programs were also more likely to believe that the mediator had been fair in
mediation than victims were to believe that judges had been fair in court.34 0
Victims in court and restorative justice programs were equally likely to believe
333. Id. at 87-89.
334. See, e.g., Child & Family Services, Restorative Justice Programs,
http://www.childfamilybny.org/Programs/RJ/default.aspx (last visited Aug. 8, 2007) (discussing
neighborhood accountability boards); Neighborhood Accountability Boards: A Guide to Learn
More About NABs 7, http://www.djj.state.fl.us/Prevention/nab/NABGuideBook.pdf (last visited
Aug. 8, 2007) [hereinafter FLORIDA GUIDE] (discussing Neighborhood Accountability Boards in
Florida Department of Juvenile Justice).
335. FLORIDA GUIDE, supra note 334, at 7.
336. Id. at 19-24.
337. See Poulson, supra note 327 (collecting studies).
338. Id. at 180.
339. Id. at 187.
340. Id. at 185.
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their opinions had been adequately considered in the criminal justice process.341
Finally, victims generally left restorative justice meetings with a better
perception of the offenders and were less likely to feel afraid or upset about the
crime than those victims who only met the offenders in court.342 Although more
studies are needed, these early findings suggest that exclusion of victim impact
statements from sentencing proceedings and inclusion of victim-offender
programming in the child's diversion or disposition plan would not only
advance the goals of the victims' rights movement, but would also avoid the
pitfalls of the courtroom interaction.
Maybe most importantly, delaying victim impact statements until after
sentencing in a juvenile case would allow judges to focus their attention on the
needs of the adjudicated child. Current victims' rights provisions ask the judge
and the probation officer to determine not only what treatment and services are
needed to rehabilitate the child, but also what financial, emotional, and material
reparations are needed to make the victim whole. In contemporary juvenile
courts where caseloads are high, probation officers who must now spend more
time with victims, assessing the impact of the child's harm and obtaining or
preparing victim impact statements, often sacrifice time they would otherwise
spend learning about the offending child and preparing the child's disposition
report.343 Likewise, judges who must allocate more time to victims in the
courtroom may compromise the court's already limited interaction with the
accused child. To reduce this tension and preserve the court's time for a
thorough examination of the socioeconomic, environmental, familial, and
mental health factors that have contributed to the child's delinquent behavior,
the judge can assign the youth to victim-offender programs that begin after the
child's disposition. If the court chooses to monitor the child's compliance and
progress in victim awareness programs, probation officers or program
coordinators may submit periodic reports to the court or provide transcripts of
the mediation. Youth who refuse to comply or fail to show progress may lose
privileges of probation or receive additional counseling and interventions to
address underlying barriers to empathy and remorse.
Finally, recognizing that many of the restorative justice and victim
awareness programs identified in this Article are time intensive and may
341. Id. at 184.
342. Id. at 193, 195-96.
343. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611A.037 (West 2003) (requiring probation officer to
summarize damages and impact of crime on victim and obtain the victim's written objections to
the probation officer's proposed disposition); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-1511 (2007) (requiring
probation officer to include statement by victim or victim's family in youth assessment or
predisposition report); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A-4A-42 (1987 & Supp. 2007) (requiring probation
officer to include victim impact statement in predisposition evaluation); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT
§ 351.1 (McKinney 1999 & Supp. 2007) (requiring probation officer to prepare victim impact
statement by consulting victim when it appears such information would be relevant); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2930.13 (LexisNexis 2006 & Supp. 2008) (requiring probation officer to use the
victim impact statement in preparing the disposition investigation report).
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impose additional costs on an already stretched juvenile justice system, this
Article does not ask policymakers to divert existing juvenile court resources to
these programs. Instead it encourages policymakers to apply for and use funds
that have already been made available for the implementation of victims'
rights. The victims' rights movement has been largely funded by federal and
state grants that compensate state and local law enforcement offices, courts,
and victim assistance agencies for implementing new, innovative programs for
victims. 344 Grants have been and are still available from organizations like the
Office for Victims of Crime and the National Association of VOCA Assistance
Administrators. 345 Victims' rights advocates and court officials have secured
funding to develop notification systems to alert victims of court dates and
outcomes, to provide counseling and other support services for victims, and to
compensate victims for medical expenses, material damages, and lost wages.
Pretrial or post-disposition victim-offender programming may well fall within
the purview of these funding sources.
2. Caveats to Restorative Justice Programs
While victim-offender mediation and other restorative justice programs
have significant benefits, they do carry some risks. Concerns about these
programs include confidentiality, the risk of coercion, the lack of cultural
sensitivity, and the considerable time commitment. These programs do not
resolve concerns about eroding confidentiality in juvenile court. 34 6 In fact, the
intimate face-to-face interaction and advance preparation necessary for
effective mediation may even increase the amount of information victims learn
about adjudicated youth. Thus, it will be essential for programs to implement
and enforce strict confidentiality protections. Both victims and offenders should
be instructed and agree not to disclose identifying information about the other,
since trust and confidentiality must be core objectives for any mediation
344. TOBOLOWSKY, CRIME VICTIM RIGHTS, supra note 7, at 7.
345. For grants available from the U.S. Department of Justice, Office for Victims of Crime,
see Discretionary Grant Application Kits, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/fund/dakitarchive.htm
(last visited Feb. 5, 2008); The Crime Victims' Rights Enforcement Project, available at
http://apply.grants.gov/opportunities/instructions/oppOVC-2007-166 l-cfdaI 6.747-instructions.pdf
(last visited Feb. 5, 2008); Nat'l Crime Victims' Rights Week Cmty. Awareness Project,
http://www.navaa.org/extlnk/lnkframe.htm?http%3A//cap.navaa.org/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2008).
For state grant recipients of federal grants, see Press Release, Kansas Office of the Governor,
Crime Victims Programs to Receive Funding (Oct. 10, 2007), available at
http://www.govemor.ks.gov/news/NewsRelease/2007/nr-07-1010a.htn (last visited Feb. 5, 2008)
(describing allocation of 3.8 million dollars in Kansas for crime victims programs). For state
crime victims assistance grants, see Oregon Department of Justice, Crime Victims' Services,
http://www.doj.state.or.us/crimev/vagrants.shtml (discussing state grants available to public and
private non-profit agencies from Criminal Injuries Compensation Account).
346. Professor Mary Ellen Reimund has summarized several statutory schemes available
for protecting confidentiality in victim offender mediation programs. Mary Ellen Reimund,
Confidentiality in Victim Offender Mediation: A False Promise?, 2004 J. DisP. RESOL. 401
(2004).
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program that seeks to bridge barriers and establish rapport between victims and
offenders.
347
Confidentiality protections will be particularly important in larger victim
impact panels, neighborhood accountability boards, and community reparation
boards where youth, victims, and volunteers will interact in a group setting.
These programs should ensure each participant's anonymity to the greatest
extent possible by withholding the child's name or identifying the child by
initials, a pseudonym, or the first name only. Recognizing that complete
anonymity will not always be possible in local neighborhood programs,
community volunteers should be selected on the condition that they agree not to
disclose names or other identifying information about the participants. Program
developers should also secure the cooperation and consent of local prosecutors
to seek sanctions for those who violate confidentiality protections.
Critics of programs like victim-offender mediation and neighborhood
accountability boards have also raised concerns about the facilitator's apparent
insensitivity to cultural and economic differences between the offender and the
larger community and about the possible coercion of juveniles in these
programs. 348 In theory, restorative justice programs attempt to restore the
parties to their respective positions before the crime. 349 Tension occurs when
restorative justice means returning the offender to an inferior status determined
by age, race, or class, with substandard living conditions and inadequate
opportunities for educational advancement and employment. 350 Coercion
occurs when adults appear to "gang up" on the child or attempt to "shame" the
child into remorse and apology. 35 1 In Florida, a guidebook for the
Neighborhood Accountability Board reminds stakeholders to employ
community reparation alternatives with caution so that an offender is not
overpowered and ostracized by a community of adults who are judging him.352
Program facilitators must go further and impose minimal standards of cultural
competence in victim-offender mediation, operate restorative justice programs
in a language and structure that is appropriate for the developmental stage of
the child, and provide a safe forum in which the child may fully participate
without shame or humiliation.
Other critics have complained that contemporary victim-offender
programs are too brief and too perfunctory to make any real difference in the
347. Id. at 409-16 (discussing variety of statutory schemes for protecting confidentiality in
victim-offender mediation).
348. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Prosecuting Violence: A Colloquy on Race, Community
and Justice, 52 STAN. L. REv. 751 (2000); Bruce A. Arrigo & Robert C. Schehr, Restoring Justice
for Juveniles: A Critical Analysis of Victim-Offender Mediation, 15 JUST. Q. 629 (1998).
349. Delgado, supra note 348, at 763-64.
350. Id.
351. Id. at 764.
352. FLORIDA GUIDE, supra note 334, at 17.
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child's behavior. 353 If the child is required to meet with the victim without any
opportunity for self-esteem building, counseling, or other services to address
the underlying causes of the child's delinquency, then victim-offender
programs may be of only limited value. This critique underscores the primary
argument in this Article: victim-offender dialogues should occur in a much
larger continuum of treatment and services for the child and the victim. Some
of the programs described in this Article, including the Bethesda Day
Treatment Center, recognize this need and work extensively with youth before
they participate in victim impact curricula.
354
While a thorough critique of the restorative justice movement is beyond
the scope of this Article, the concerns identified here suggest that the wholesale
adoption of existing restorative justice and victim-offender mediation programs
would be a mistake. It is critical that any victim-offender interaction be
facilitated by well-trained, unbiased mediators who understand the particular
vulnerabilities of youth and remain committed to confidentiality standards.
B. Recommendations to Preserve Due Process
This Article calls for the incorporation of victim impact statements into
the long-term treatment plan for an adjudicated youth and for the exclusion of
these statements from the youth's disposition hearing. Recognizing that not
every state will take this approach, this Article also proposes, in the alternative,
that states enact strict statutory limitations on the introduction and content of
victim impact statements. The procedural protections I propose here flow
naturally from the concerns identified in Part II.D and do not require extensive
discussion.
Currently, the child's only protections against overbroad and unreliable
victim impact statements lie in vague notions of due process that preclude the
introduction of evidence that is "so unduly prejudicial" that it would render the
trial or sentence unfair.355 Following Arkansas's lead, states should adopt
formal procedures to provide the respondent with an opportunity to confront
and challenge evidence at sentencing. 356 Victims' rights statutes should also
require prosecutors and probation officers to provide the child's counsel with
copies of any documents that will be admitted into evidence well in advance of
the disposition. Such documents might include medical and mental health
records, insurance claims, invoices for property repair, and victim impact
statements. States should further require that victim impact statements be sworn
under oath and enforced with the penalty of perjury for false statements. Judges
should exclude cumulative and highly inflammatory statements and consider
limiting the number of victims who speak when large numbers of victims are
353. Delgado, supra note 348, at 765.
354. See supra notes 281-285 and accompanying text.
355. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825 (1991).
356. See supra note 295 and accompanying text.
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affected.
In juvenile courts, states should narrowly limit the content of victim
impact statements to the impact of the crime on the victim and generally
exclude, with few exceptions, any reference to the victim's opinion about the
child's character and the disposition the child should receive. In jurisdictions
that still conduct confidential juvenile proceedings, statutes should limit the
victim's ight to bring relatives and other support persons in the courtroom.
When victims need moral support or help in drafting victim impact statements,
that support can be provided in advance of the court hearing by victim
assistance advocates and relatives who wait outside of the courtroom when the
victim presents his statement. While reasonable accommodations should be
made for young children who are victims of juvenile crime, these
accommodations should limit the victim's support to one adult who may
accompany the child in the proceedings. Prosecutors, judges, and law
enforcement officers should also impose and strictly enforce rules against
further disclosure of confidential juvenile information.
Finally, victim impact statements should be victim specific and thereby
preclude representatives from neighborhood associations from speaking or
submitting written impact statements unless the association was the direct
target or victim of an offense committed by the child. Even in Payne v.
Tennessee, the Supreme Court presumed that victim impact statements would
discuss specific harms caused by the defendant being sentenced.357 Broad
statements about the general effects of crime on the community would not meet
this limitation.
CONCLUSION
Although rehabilitation is no longer the only goal of the juvenile justice
system, it certainly is and should remain an important component of our
response to juvenile delinquency. A growing body of literature on the science
of adolescent development recognizes that youth as a class are more amenable
to treatment than adults and suggests that youth may have diminished
culpability when they engage in delinquent conduct. As long as the underlying
science is valid, this literature should compel us to adopt juvenile justice
policies and procedures that will capitalize on the child's prospects for reform
and account for the limitations in the child's cognitive and emotional
capacities. This Article contends that victim impact statements, as currently
used in juvenile court, undermine both of these objectives.
Victim impact statements delivered in the strained and highly charged
environment of the courtroom are unlikely to cultivate the healing and
satisfaction victims seek after crime. Evidence suggests that many youth are not
357. 501 U.S. at 825 (noting that extent of harm to the victim correlates with the culpability
of the offender).
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intellectually and emotionally equipped to meet the high expectations of judges
and victims who expect offenders to demonstrate sincere remorse and
contrition at the juvenile disposition hearing. Not only are victims disappointed
by the child's inadequate responses to the victim impact statement, but judges
are also more likely to penalize the child for his apparent disrespect and lack of
empathy for the victim.
Fortunately, current impediments to victim satisfaction and offender
rehabilitation do not require us to wholly abandon victim impact statements.
These statements are valuable in the juvenile justice system because they allow
victims to express pain and fear to the offender and may help victims find
healing and closure after crime if they are meaningfully considered by the
child. Victim impact statements may also aid in the child's rehabilitation if they
are made at a time and in a forum that is safe and supportive for the child.
Thus, to make better use of victim impact statements, this Article proposes that
these statements be excluded from the juvenile disposition hearing and instead
be incorporated into pretrial diversion programs or post-disposition treatment
plans that include counseling and other services for the child. Incorporation of
victim impact evidence at victim-offender mediation and victim impact panels
would foster greater empathy and remorse from the child and encourage
forgiveness by the victim. Furthermore, it would preserve the child's due
process rights at sentencing and allow the court to focus on the child's
individual needs, meeting the compromised, but not forgotten, goal of
rehabilitation in the juvenile justice system.
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